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A game theoretic model of scrip systems in analyzed. It is shown that scrip sys-
tems have pure strategy equilibria in a natural class of strategies. An algorithm
is given that can compute such an equilibrium and the resulting distribution of
money (scrip). The effect of varying the total amount of money in the system
on efficiency (i.e., social welfare—the total utility of all the agents in the system)
is analyzed, and it is shown that by maintaining the appropriate ratio between
the total amount of money and the number of agents, efficiency is maximized.
This ratio can be found by increasing the money supply up to the point that the
system experiences a “monetary crash,” where money is sufficiently devalued
that no agent is willing to perform a service. The implications of the presence
of altruists, hoarders, sybils, and collusion on the performance of the system are
examined. In practice, agents in a scrip system will not have the necessary in-
formation to compute this equilibrium. However, a simple learning algorithm
is investigated and simulation results are presented that show it enables agents
to converge to equilibrium.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Ian Alexander Kash was born September 14, 1982. After graduating from Pleas-
antville High School, he attended Carnegie Mellon University. In May 2004, he
received the Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science with additional
majors in Mathematics and Philosophy.
iii
To my parents.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Randy Farmer, Peter Harremoes, Shane Henderson, Jon
Kleinberg, David Parkes, Dan Reeves, Michael Wellman, and anonymous ref-
erees for helpful suggestions, discussions, and criticisms. Emin Gu¨n Sirer and
E´va Tardos have served on my committee and provided me with valuable feed-
back. My advisors, Eric Friedman and Joseph Halpern, have been a tremendous
source of ideas, support, and guidance, and have patiently read the many drafts
of this work in all of its previous forms. Finally, I would like to thank my family
and friends for all their encouragement and support. This research was sup-
ported in part by NSF under grants ITR-0325453, CDI-0835706, CTC-0208535,
IIS-0812045, and IIS-0534064; by ONR under grant N00014-01-10-511; by the
DoD Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) program admin-
istered by the ONR under grants N00014-01-1-0795 and N00014-04-1-0725; and
by AFOSR under grants F49620-02-1-0101, FA9550-08-1-0438, FA9550-05-1-0055,
and FA9550-09-1-0266.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Biographical Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
1 Introduction and Related Work 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 A Model of a Scrip System 17
2.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Analyzing the Distribution of Wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Existence of Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3 Implications of the Model 38
3.1 Social Welfare and Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2 Dealing with Nonstandard Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.1 Altruists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.2 Hoarders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.3 Sybils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.4 Collusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Identifying User Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4 Learning in Scrip Systems 71
4.1 Introduction to Learning in Distributed Systems . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 Theoretical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2.1 Large Anonymous Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2.2 Best-Reply Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.3 Stage Learners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2.4 Convergence Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3.1 A Contribution Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3.2 A Congestion Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3.3 Scrip Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5 Conclusion 94
A Appendix 103
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A.2 Proofs from Section 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A.3 Proofs from Section 3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
vi
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Bibliography 127
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 A hypothetical best-reply function with one type of agent. . . . . 33
2.2 Maximum distance from minimum relative entropy distribution
over 106 timesteps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 Distance from minimum relative entropy distribution with 1000
agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4 Average time to get within .001 of the minimum relative entropy
distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1 Social welfare for various average amounts of money, demon-
strating a monetary crash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 Altruists can cause a crash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 m can be adjusted as a increases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 The effect of pu on utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5 The effect of sybils on utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.6 Sybils can improve utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.7 Sybils can cause a crash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.8 The effect of collusion on utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.9 Distribution of money with two types of agents. . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.10 Log of the distribution of money with two types of agents. . . . . 69
4.1 Stage Learners with Random Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Hart and Mas-Colell with Random Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3 Exp3 with Random matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4 Stage Learning with Average-Based Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5 Stage Learners in a Congestion Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.6 Stage Learners in a Scrip System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.7 A Scrip System with Churn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.8 A Scrip System with Different Stage Lengths . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
viii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND RELATEDWORK
1.1 Introduction
Historically, non-governmental organizations have issued their own currencies
for a wide variety of purposes. These currencies, known as scrip, have been
used in company towns where government issued currency was scarce [72], in
Washington DC to reduce the robbery rate of bus drivers [77], and in Ithaca
(New York) to promote fairer pay and improve the local economy [45]. Scrip
systems are also becoming more prevalent in online systems.
To give some examples, market-based solutions using scrip systems have
been suggested for applications such as system-resource allocation [58], manag-
ing replication and query optimization in a distributed database [68], and allo-
cating experimental time on a wireless sensor network test bed [17]; a number
of sophisticated scrip systems have been proposed [35, 44, 75] to allow agents to
pool resources while avoiding what is known as free riding, where agents take
advantage of the resources the system provides while providing none of their
own (as Adar andHuberman [2] have shown, this behavior certainly takes place
in systems such as Gnutella); and Yootles [63] uses a scrip system as a way of
helping groups make decisions using economic mechanisms without involving
real money.
Creating a scrip system creates a new market where goods and services can
be exchanged that may have been impractical or undesirable to implement with
standard currency. However, the potential benefits of a scrip system will not
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necessarily be realized simply by creating the framework to support one. The
story of the Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op [69], popularized by Krugman [50],
provides a cautionary tale. The Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op was a group of
parents working on Capitol Hill who agreed to cooperate to provide babysit-
ting services to each other. In order to enforce fairness, they issued a supply
of scrip with each coupon worth a half hour of babysitting. At one point, the
co-op had a recession. Many people wanted to save up coupons for when they
wanted to spend an evening out. As a result, they went out less and looked for
more opportunities to babysit. Since a couple could earn coupons only when
another couple went out, no one could accumulate more, and the problem only
got worse.
After a number of failed attempts to solve the problem, such as mandating
a certain frequency of going out, the co-op started issuing more coupons. The
results were striking. Since couples had a sufficient reserve of coupons, they
were more comfortable spending them. This in turn made it much easier to
earn coupons when a couple’s supply got low. Unfortunately, the amount of
scrip grew to the point that most of the couples felt “rich.” They had enough
scrip for the foreseeable future, so naturally they didn’t want to devote their
evening to babysitting. As a result, couples who wanted to go out were unable
to find another couple willing to babysit.
This anecdote shows that the amount of scrip in circulation can have a sig-
nificant impact on the effectiveness of a scrip system. If there is too little money
in the system, few agents will be able to afford service. At the other extreme,
if there is too much money in the system, people feel rich and stop looking for
work. Both of these extremes lead to inefficient outcomes. This suggests that
2
there is an optimal amount of money, and that nontrivial deviations from the
optimum towards either extreme can lead to significant degradation in the per-
formance of the system.
In this paper, we provide a formal model in which to analyze scrip systems.
We describe a simple scrip system and show that, under reasonable assump-
tions, for each fixed amount of money there is a nontrivial equilibrium involv-
ing threshold strategies, where an agent accepts a request if he has less than $k for
some threshold k.1
An interesting aspect of our analysis is that, in equilibrium, the distribution
of users with each amount of money is the distribution that minimizes relative
entropy to an appropriate distribution (subject to the money supply constraint).
This allows us to use techniques from statistical mechanics to explicitly compute
the distribution of money and thus agents’ best-reply functions.
An understanding of agents’ best-reply functions allows us to compute the
money supply that maximizes social welfare, given the number of agents. Aswe
show, adding more money decreases the equilibrium number of agents with no
money, thus increasing social welfare. However, this only works up to a point.
Once a critical amount of money is reached, the system experiences a monetary
crash: there is so much money that, in equilibrium, everyone will feel rich and
no agents are willing to work. We show that, to get optimal performance, we
want the total amount of money in the system to be as close as possible to the
critical amount, but not to go over it. If the amount of money in the system
is over the critical amount, we get the worst possible equilibrium, where all
agents have utility 0. This provides a significant tradeoff between efficiency
1Although we refer to our unit of scrip as the dollar, these are not real dollars nor do we view
them as convertible to dollars.
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and robustness.
Our equilibrium analysis assumes that all agents have somewhat similar
motivation: in particular, they do not get pleasure simply from performing a
service, and are interested in money only to the extent that they can use it to
get services performed. But in real systems, not all agents have this motivation.
Some of the more common “nonstandard” agents are altruists and hoarders. Al-
truists are willing to satisfy all requests, even if they go unpaid; hoarders value
scrip for its own sake and are willing to accumulate amounts far beyond what is
actually useful. Studies of the Gnutella peer-to-peer file-sharing network have
shown that one percent of agents satisfy fifty percent of the requests [2, 43].
These agents are doing significantly more work for others than they will ever
have done for them, so can be viewed as altruists. Anecdotal evidence also
suggests that the introduction of any sort of currency seems to inspire hoard-
ing behavior on the part of some agents, regardless of the benefit of possessing
money. For example, SETI@home has found that contributors put in signifi-
cant effort to make it to the top of their contributor rankings. This has included
returning fake results of computations rather than performing them [82].
Altruists and hoarders have opposite effects on a system: having altruists
has the same effect as adding money; having hoarders is essentially equivalent
to removing it. With enough altruists in the system, the system has a monetary
crash, in the sense that standard agents stop being willing to provide service,
just as when there is too much money in the system. We show that, until we get
to the point where the system crashes, the utility of standard agents is improved
by the presence of altruists. We show that the presence of altruists makes the
critical point lower than it would without them. Thus, a system designer trying
4
to optimize the performance of the system bymaking themoney supply as close
as possible to the critical point (but under it, since being over it would result in
a “crash”) needs to be careful about estimating the number of altruists.
Similarly, we show that, as the fraction of hoarders increases, standard
agents begin to suffer because there is effectively less money in circulation. On
the other hand, hoarders can improve the stability of a system. Since hoarders
are willing to accept an infinite amount of money, they can prevent the mone-
tary crash that would otherwise occur as money was added. In any case, our
results show how the presence of both altruists and hoarders can be mitigated
by appropriately controlling the money supply.
Beyond nonstandard agents, we also consider two different manipulative
behaviors in which standard agents may engage: creating multiple identities,
known as sybils [22], and collusion. In scrip systems where each new user is
given an initial amount of scrip, there is an obvious benefit to creating sybils.
Even if this incentive is removed, sybils are still useful: they can be used to
increase the likelihood that an agent will be asked to provide service, which
makes it easier for him to earn money. This increases the utility of the sybilling
agent, at the expense of other agents. From the perspective of an agent con-
sidering creating sybils, the first few sybils can provide him with a significant
benefit, but the benefits of additional sybils rapidly diminish. So if a designer
can make sybilling moderately costly, the number of sybils actually created by
rational agents will usually be relatively small.
If a small fraction of agents have sybils, the situation is more subtle. Agents
with sybils still do better than those without, but the situation is not zero-sum.
In particular, even agents without sybils might be better off, due to having more
5
opportunities to earn money. Somewhat surprisingly, sybils can actually result
in everyone being better off. However, exploiting this fact is generally not de-
sirable. The same process that leads to an improvement in social welfare can
also lead to a monetary crash, where all agents stop providing service. The sys-
tem designer can achieve the same effects by increasing the average amount of
money or biasing the volunteer selection process. In practice, it seems better to
do this than to exploit the possibility of sybils.
In our setting, having sybils is helpful because it increases the likelihood
that an agent will be asked to provide service. Our analysis of sybils applies
no matter how this increase in likelihood occurs. In particular, it applies to ad-
vertising. Thus, our results suggest that there are tradeoffs involved in allowing
advertising. For example, many systems allow agents to announce their connec-
tion speed and other similar factors. If this biases requests towards agents with
high connection speeds, even when agents with lower connection speeds are
perfectly capable of satisfying a particular request, then agents with low con-
nection speeds will have an unnecessarily worsened experience in the system.
This also means that such agents will have a strong incentive to lie about their
connection speed.
While collusion in generally a bad thing, in the context of scrip systems with
fixed prices, it is almost entirely positive. Without collusion, if a user runs out
of money he is unable to request service until he is able to earn some. However,
a colluding group can pool there money so that all members can make a request
whenever the group as a whole has some money. This increases welfare for
the agents who collude because agents who have no money receive no service.
Collusion tends to benefit the non-colluding agents as well. Since colluding
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agents work less often, it is easier for everyone to earn money, which ends up
making everyone better off. However, as with sybils, collusion does have the
potential of crashing the system if the average amount of money is high.
While a designer should generally encourage collusion, we would expect
that in most systems there will be relatively little collusion and what collusion
exists will involve small numbers of agents. After all, scrip systems exist to try
and resolve resource-allocation problems where agents are competing with each
other. If they could collude to optimally allocate resources within the group,
they would not need a scrip system in the first place. However, many of the
benefits of collusion come from agents being allowed to effectively have a nega-
tive amount of money (by borrowing from their collusive partners). These ben-
efits could also be realized if agents are allowed to borrow money, so designing
a loan mechanism could be an important improvement for a scrip system. Of
course, implementing such a loan mechanism in a way that prevents abuse re-
quires a careful design.
In order to effectively utilize our results, a system designer needs to be able
to identify characteristics of agents (with what frequency do theymake requests,
how likely are they to be chosen to satisfy a request, and so on) and what strate-
gies they are following. This is particularly useful because finding an amount
of money close to the point of monetary crash, but not past it, relies on an un-
derstanding of the agents in the system. Of course, such information is also of
great interest to social scientists and marketers. We show how relatively simple
observations of the system can be used to infer this information.
It is not only the system designer that does not know the characteristics
of the agents in the system; agents will generally be unaware of each other’s
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characteristics. The raises a natural question: how will agents find the equilib-
rium strategies in a scrip system? In Chapter 4, we investigate the more gen-
eral problem of agent’s learning what strategy to use in a distributed system.
While multiagent learning lacks practical general algorithms, distributed sys-
tems have several simplifying characteristics. First, there are a large number
of agents learning. Second, they are anonymous, agents payoffs depend on the
number of (each type of) agent that plays each strategy rather than on exactly
which agents play which strategy. Third, in many systems, and in particular
in scrip systems, best-reply dynamics converge. We show that, in such games,
simple algorithms suffice to allow agents to learn equilibria.
We prove convergence results for an algorithm know as stage learning [27].
An agent using the stage learning algorithm divides the rounds of the game into
a series of stages. In each stage, he uses a fixed strategy except that he occasion-
ally explores. At the end of a stage, he chooses as his strategy for the next stage
whatever strategy had the highest average reward in the current stage.
To go with these theoretical results, we provide simulations to show that
stage learning is effective in practice. While the theoretical results about stage
learning are restricted to simpler games and do not directly apply to scrip sys-
tems, these simulations show that stage learning still allows agents to converge
to equilibrium. Our results also demonstrate that stage learning is robust to
factors such as churn (agents joining and leaving the system) and asynchrony
(agents using stages of different lengths).
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1.2 Related Work
Scrip systems have a long history in computer science, with two main thrusts:
resource allocation and free-riding prevention. Early applications for resource
allocation include agoric systems [58], which envisioned solving problems such
as processor scheduling using markets, and Mariposa [68], a market-driven
query optimizer for distributed databases. More recently, scrip systems have
been used to allocate the resources of research testbeds. Examples include Mi-
rage [17] for wireless sensor networks, Bellagio [7] for PlanetLab, and Egg [15]
for grid computing. Virtual markets have been used to coordinate the activity
of nodes of a sensor network [52]. Yootles [63] uses a scrip to help people make
everyday decisions, such as where to have lunch, without involving real money.
Systems that use scrip to prevent free riding include KARMA [75], which
provides a general framework for P2P networks. Gupta et al. [35] propose what
they call a “debit-credit reputation computation” for P2P networks, which is
essentially a scrip system. Fileteller [44] uses payments in a network file stor-
age system. Dandelion [67] uses scrip in a content distribution setting. Be-
lenkiy et al. [8] consider how a BitTorrent-like system can make use of e-cash.
Antfarm [61] uses scrip to optmize content distribution across a number of
BitTorrent-like swarms.
Despite this tremendous interest in scrip systems, there has been relatively
little work studying how they behave. Chun et al. [59] studied user behavior
in a deployed scrip system and observed that users tried various (rational) ma-
nipulations of the auction mechanism used by the system. Their observations
suggest that system designers will have to deal with game-theoretic concerns.
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Hens et al. [40] do a theoretical analysis of what can be viewed as a scrip sys-
tem in a related model. There are a number of significant differences between
the models. First, in the Hens et al. model, there is essentially only one type of
agent, but an agent’s utility for getting service (our γt) may change over time.
Thus, at any time, there will be agents who differ in their utility. At each round,
we assume that one agent is chosen (by nature) to make a request for service,
while other agents decide whether or not to provide it. In the Hens et al. model,
at each round, each agent decides whether to provide service, request service,
or opt out, as a function of his utilities and the amount of money he has. They
assume that there is no cost for providing service and everyone is able to pro-
vide service. Under this assumption, a system with optimal performance is one
where half the agents request service and the other half are willing to provide it.
Despite these differences, Hens et al. also show that agents will use a threshold
strategy. However, although they have inefficient equilibria, because there is no
cost for providing service, their model does not exhibit the monetary crashes
that our model can exhibit.
Aperjis and Johari [4] examine a model of a P2P filesharing system as an
exchange economy. They associate a price (in bandwidth) with each file and
find a market equilibrium in the resulting economy. However, they do not use
an explicit currency.
The effects of altruists, sybils, and collusion on system behavior have all been
studied in other contexts. Work on the evolution of cooperation stresses the
importance of altruists willing to undertake costly punishment [38]. Yokoo et
al. [80] studied the effects of sybils in auctions. Solution concepts such as strong
Nash equilibrium [6] and k-t robust equilibrium [1] explicitly address collusion in
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games; Hayrapetyan et al. [39] study collusion in congestion games and find
cases where, as with scrip systems, collusion is actually beneficial.
The ultimate goal of a scrip systems is to promote cooperation. While there
is limited theoretical work on scrip systems, there is a large body of work on
cooperation. Much of the work involves a large group of agents being randomly
matched to pay a game such as prisoner’s dilemma. Such models were studied
in the economics literature [49, 23] and first applied to online reputations in [26];
Feldman et al. [24] apply them to P2P systems.
These models fail to capture important asymmetries in the interactions of the
agents. When a request is made, there are typically many people in the network
who can potentially satisfy it (especially in a large P2P network), but not all
can. For example, some people may not have the time or resources to satisfy
the request. The random-matching process ignores the fact that some people
may not be able to satisfy the request. (Presumably, if the person matched with
the requester could not satisfy the match, he would have to defect.) Moreover,
it does not capture the fact that the decision as to whether to “volunteer” to
satisfy the request should be made before the matching process, not after. That
is, the matching process does not capture the fact that if someone is unwilling to
satisfy the request, there will doubtless be others who can satisfy it. Finally, the
actions and payoffs in prisoner’s dilemma game do not obviously correspond
to actual choices that can be made. For example, it is not clear what defection
on the part of the requester means. Our model addresses all these issues.
Scrip systems are not the only approach to preventing free riding. Two other
approaches often used in P2P networks are barter and reputation systems. Per-
haps the best-known example of a system that uses barter is BitTorrent [19],
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where clients downloading a file try to find other clients with parts they are
missing so that they can trade, thus creating a roughly equal amount of work.
Since the barter is restricted to users currently interested in a single file, this
works well for popular files, but tends to have problems maintaining availabil-
ity of less popular ones. An example of a barter-like system built on top of a
more traditional file-sharing system is the credit system used by eMule. Each
user tracks his history of interactions with other users and gives priority to those
he has downloaded from in the past. However, in a large system, the probability
that a pair of randomly-chosen users will have interacted before is quite small,
so this interaction history will not be terribly helpful. Anagnostakis and Green-
wald [3] present a more sophisticated version of this approach, but it still seems
to suffer from similar problems.
A number of attempts have been made at providing general reputation sys-
tems (e.g. [34, 35, 48, 79]). The basic idea is to aggregate each user’s experience
into a global number for each individual that intuitively represents the system’s
view of that individual’s reputation. However, these attempts tend to suffer
from practical problems because they implicitly view users as either “good” or
“bad”, assume that the “good” users will act according to the specified proto-
col, and that there are relatively few “bad” users. Unfortunately, if there are
easy ways to game the system, once this information becomes widely available,
rational users are likely to make use of it. We cannot count on only a few users
being “bad” (in the sense of not following the prescribed protocol). For exam-
ple, Kazaa uses a measure of the ratio of the number of uploads to the number
of downloads to identify good and bad users. However, to avoid penalizing
new users, they gave new users an average rating. Users discovered that they
could use this relatively good rating to free ride for a while and, once it started
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to get bad, they could delete their stored information and effectively come back
as a “new” user, thus circumventing the system (see [3] for a discussion and [26]
for a formal analysis of this “whitewashing”). Thus, Kazaa’s reputation system
is ineffective.
Chapter 4 explores how agents can learn equilibrium strategies in a distrib-
uted system such as a scrip system. One approach to learning to play games
is to generalize reinforcement learning algorithms such as Q-learning [78]. One
nice feature of this approach is that it can handle games with state, which is im-
portant in distributed systems. In Q-learning, an agent associates a value with
each state-action pair. When he chooses action a in state s, he updates the value
Q(s, a) based on the reward he received and the best value he can achieve in the
resulting state s′ (maxa′ Q(s′, a′)). When generalizing to multiple agents, s and
a become vectors of the state and action of every agent and the max is replaced
by a prediction of the behavior of other agents. Different algorithms use differ-
ent predictions; for example, Nash-Q uses a Nash equilibrium calculation [42].
See [66] for a survey.
Unfortunately, these algorithms converge too slowly for a large distributed
system. The algorithm needs to experience each possible action profile many
times to guarantee convergence. So, with n agents and k strategies, the naive
convergence time is O(kn). Even with a better representation for anonymous
games, the convergence time is still O(nk) (typically k ≪ n). There is also a more
fundamental problem with this approach: it assumes information that an agent
is unlikely to have. In order to know which value to update, the agent must
learn the action chosen by every other agent. In practice, an agent will learn
something about the actions of the agents with whom he directly interacts, but
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is unlikely to gain much information about the actions of other agents.
Another approach is no-regret learning, where agents choose a strategy for
each round that guarantees that the regret of their choices will be low. Hart and
Mas-Colell [36] present such a learning procedure that converges to a correlated
equilibrium2 given knowledge of what the payoffs of every action would have
been in each round. They also provide a variant of their algorithm that requires
only information about the agent’s actual payoffs [37]. However, to guarantee
convergence to within ǫ of a correlated equilibrium requires O(kn/ǫ2 log kn), still
too slow for large systems. Furthermore, the convergence guarantee is that the
distribution of play converges to equilibrium; the strategies of individual learn-
ers will not converge. Many other no-regret algorithms exist [11]. In Section 4.3,
we use the Exp3 algorithm [5]. They can achieve even better convergence in
restricted settings. For example, Blum et al. [10] showed that in routing games
a continuum of no-regret learners will approximate Nash equilibrium in a finite
amount of time.
Foster and Young [25] use a stage-learning procedure that converges to Nash
equilibrium for two-player games. Germano and Lugosi [30] showed that it
converges for generic n-player games (games where best replies are unique).
Young [81] uses a similar algorithm without explicit stages that also converges
for generic n-player games. Rather than selecting best replies, in these algo-
rithms agents choose new actions randomly when not in equilibrium. Unfor-
tunately, these algorithms involve searching the whole strategy space, so their
convergence time is exponential. Another algorithm that uses stages to pro-
vide a stable learning environment is the ESRL algorithm for coordinated ex-
2Correlated equilibrium is a more general solution concept than Nash equilibrium; see [60];
every Nash euqilibrium is a correlated equilibrium, but there may be correlated equilibria that
are not Nash equilibria.
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ploration [74].
Marden et al. [55, 54] use an algorithm with experimentation and best replies
but without explicit stages that converges for weakly acyclic games, where best-
reply dynamics converge when agents move one at a time, rather than mov-
ing all at once, as we assume here. Convergence is based on the existence of
a sequence of exploration moves that lead to equilibrium. With n agents who
explore with probability ǫ, this analysis gives a convergence time of O(1/ǫn).
Furthermore, the guarantee requires ǫ to be sufficiently small that agents essen-
tially explore one at a time, so ǫ needs to be O(1/n).
There is a long history of work examining simple learning procedures such
as fictitious play [28], where each agentmakes a best response assuming that each
other player’s strategy is characterized by the empirical frequency of his ob-
served moves. In contrast to algorithms with convergence guarantees for gen-
eral games, these algorithms fail to converge in many games. But for classes of
games where they do converge, they tend to do so rapidly. However, most work
in this area assumes that the actions of agents are observed by all agents, agents
know the payoff matrix, and payoffs are deterministic. A recent approach in
this tradition is based on the Win or Learn Fast principle, which has limited
convergence guarantees but often performs well in practice [13]. Hopkins [41]
showed that many such procedures converge in symmetric games with an in-
finite number of learners, although his results provide no guarantees about the
rate of convergence.
There is also a body of empirical work on the convergence of learning algo-
rithms in multiagent settings. Q-learning has had empirical success in pricing
games [71], n-player cooperative games [18], and grid world games [12]. Green-
15
wald at al. [32] showed that a number of algorithms, including stage learning,
converge in a variety of simple games. Marden et al. [54] found that their algo-
rithm converged must faster in a congestion game than the theoretical analysis
would suggest. Our theorem suggests an explanation for these empirical obser-
vations: best-reply dynamics converge in all these games. While our theorem
applies directly only to stage learning, it provides intuition as to why algorithms
that learn “quickly enough” and change their behavior “slowly enough” rapidly
converge to Nash equilibrium in practice.
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CHAPTER 2
AMODEL OF A SCRIP SYSTEM
2.1 The Model
Before specifying our model formally, we give an intuitive description of what
our model captures. We model a scrip system where, as in the babysitting co-
op, agents provide each other with service. There is a single service (babysitting)
that agents occasionally want. In practice, at any given time, a number of agents
will want service, but to simplify the formal description and analysis we model
the scrip system as proceeding in a series of rounds where, in each round, a
single agent wants service (the time between rounds will be adjusted to capture
the growth in parallelism as the number of agents grows).1 In each round, af-
ter an agent requests service, other agents have to decide whether they want to
volunteer to provide service. However, not all agents may be able to satisfy the
request (not everyone can babysit every night). While, in practice, the ability
of agents to provide service at various times may be correlated for a number of
reasons (some agents might have very young children that only certain agents
are willing to babysit; being unavailable in one round might be correlated with
being unavailable in the next round; and so on), for simplicity we model the
ability to provide service using a single probability, and assume that the events
of an agent being able to provide service in different rounds or two agents be-
ing able to provide service in the same or different rounds are independent. If
there is at least one volunteer, someone is chosen from among the volunteers
1For large numbers of agents, our model converges to one in which agents make requests in
real time, and the time between an agent’s requests is exponentially distributed. In addition,
the time between requests served by a single player is also exponentially distributed.
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(uniformly at random) to satisfy the request. The requester then gains some
utility (he was able to go out because he had a babysitter) and the volunteer
loses some utility (people would rather do something other than babysit), and
the requester pays the volunteer a fee that we fix at one dollar. As is standard in
the literature, we assume that agents discount future payoffs. This captures the
intuition that a util now is worth more than a util tomorrow, and allows us to
compute the total utility derived by an agent in an infinite game. The amount of
utility gained by having a service performed and the amount lost be performing
it, as well as many other parameters may depend on the agent.
More formally, we assume that agents have a type t drawn from some finite
set T of types. We can describe the entire population of agents using the pair
(T, ~f ), where ~f is a vector of length |T | and ft is the fraction with type t. For most
of the paper, we consider only what we call standard agents. These are agents
who derive no pleasure from performing a service, and for whom money has
no intrinsic value. We can characterize the type of a standard agent by a tuple
t = (αt, βt, γt, δt, ρt, χt), where
• αt > 0 reflects the cost for an agent of type t to satisfy a request;
• 0 < βt ≤ 1 is the probability that an agent of type t can satisfy a request;
• γt > αt is the utility that an agent of type t gains for having a request
satisfied;
• 0 < δt < 1 is the rate at which an agent of type t discounts utility;
• ρt > 0 represents the (relative) request rate (some people need babysitting
more often than others). For example, if there are two types of agents with
ρt1 = 2 and ρt2 = 1 then agents of the first type will make requests twice as
often as agents of the second type. Since these request rates are relative,
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we can multiply them all by a constant to normalize them. To simplify
later notation, we assume the ρt are normalized so that
∑
t∈T ρt ft = 1; and
• χt > 0 represents the (relative) likelihood of an agent to be chosen when
he volunteers (some babysitters may be more popular than others). In
particular, this means the relative probability of two given agents being
chosen is independent of which other agents volunteer.
• ωt = βtχt/ρt is not part of the tuple, but is an important derived parameter
that, as we will see in Section 2.2, helps determine how much money an
agent will have.
Representing the population of agents in a system as (T, ~f ) captures the es-
sential features of a scrip system we want to model: there are a large number of
agents who may have different types. Note that some tuples (T, ~f ) may be in-
compatible with there being some number N of agents. For example, if there are
two types, and ~f says that half of the agents are of each type, then there cannot
be 101 agents. Similar issues arise when we want to talk about the amount of
money in example, by specifying how to assign to types to agents in a way that
we could deal with this problem in a number of ways (for example, by having
each agent determine his type at random according to the distribution ~f ). For
convenience, we simply do not consider population sizes that are incompatible
with ~f . This is the approach used in the literature on N-replica economies [56].
Formally, we consider games specified by a tuple (T, ~f , h,m, n), where T and
~f are as defined above, h ∈ N is the base number of agents of each type, n ∈
N is number of replicas of these agents and m ∈ R+ is the average amount of
money. The total number of agents is thus hn. We ensure that the number of
agents of type t is exactly ft and that the average amount of money is exactly
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m by requiring that fth ∈ N and mh ∈ N. Having created a base population
satisfying these constraints, we can make an arbitrary number of copies of it.
More precisely, we assume that agents 0 . . . ft1h−1 have type t1, agents ft1h . . . ( ft1+
ft2)h−1 have type t2, and so on through agent h−1. These base agents determine
the types of all other agents. Each agent j ∈ {h, . . . , hn − 1} has the same type as
j mod h; that is, all the agents of the form j + kh for k = 1, . . . , n − 1 are replicas
of agent j. At the start of the game, we initially allocate each of the hmn dollars
in the system to an agent chosen uniformly at random.
We now describe (T, ~f , h,m, n) as an infinite extensive-form game. A non-root
node in the game tree is associated with a round number (how many requests
have been made so far), a phase number, either 1, 2, 3 , or 4 (which describes
how far along we are in determining the results of the current request), a vector
~x where xi is the current amount of money agent i has, and
∑
i xi = mhn, and, for
some nodes, some additional information whose role will be made clear below.
We use τ(i) to denote the type of agent i.
• The game starts at a special root node, denoted Λ, where nature moves.
Intuitively, at Λ, nature allocates money uniformly at random, so it transi-
tions to a node of the form (0, 1, ~x): round zero, phase one, and allocation
of money ~x, and each possible transition is equally likely.
• At a node of the form (r, 1, ~x), nature selects an agent to make a request in
the current round. Agent i is chosen with probability ρτ(i)/hn. If i is chosen,
a transition is made to (r, 2, ~x, i).
• At a node of the form (r, 2, ~x, i), nature selects the set V of agents (not in-
cluding i) able to satisfy the request. Each agent j , i is included in V with
probability βτ( j). If V is chosen, a transition is made to (r, 3, ~x, i,V).
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• At a node of the form (r, 3, ~x, i,V), each agent in V chooses whether to vol-
unteer. If V ′ is the set of agents who choose to volunteer, a transition is
made to (r, 4, ~x, i,V ′).
• At a node of the form (r, 4, ~x, i,V ′), if V ′ , ∅, nature chooses a single
agent in V ′ to satisfy the request. Each agent j is chosen with probabil-
ity χτ( j)/
∑
j′∈V ′ χτ( j′). If j is chosen, a transition is made to (r+1, 1, ~x′), where
x′j =

x j − 1 if i = j and x j > 0,
x j + 1 if j is chosen by nature and xi > 0,
x j otherwise.
If V ′ = ∅, nature has no choice; a transition is made to (r + 1, 1, ~x) with
probability 1.
A strategy for agent j describes whether or not he will volunteer at every
node of the form (r, 3, ~x, i,V) such that j ∈ V . (These are the only nodes where
j can move.) A strategy profile ~S consists of one strategy per agent. A strategy
profile ~S determines a probability distribution over paths Pr~S in the game tree.
Each path determines the value of the following random two variables:
• xri , the amount of money agent i has during round r, defined as the value
of xi at the nodes with round number r and
• uri , the utility of agent i for round r. If i is a standard agent, then
uri =

γτ(i) if a node (r, 4, ~x, i,V ′) is on the path with V ′ , 0
−ατ(i) if i is chosen by nature at node (r, 4, ~x, j,V ′)
0 otherwise.
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Ui(~S ), the total expected utility of agent i if strategy profile ~S , is played is the
discounted sum of his per round utilities uri , but the exact form of the discount-
ing requires some explanation. As the number of agents increases, we would
expect more requests to be made per unit time, and the expected number of re-
quests an agent makes per unit time to be constant. Since only one agent makes
a request per round, it seems that a reasonable way to model this is to take
the time between rounds to be 1/n, where n is the number of agents. The dis-
count rate—which can be thought of as the present value of getting one util one
round in the future—has to be modified as well. It turns out that the obvious
choice of discount rate, δ1/nt , is not appropriate. To understand why, consider an
agent who has all of his requests satisfied. When there are just h agents, he is
chosen to make a request each round with probability ρt/h. His total expected
utility with a discount rate of δ is
∑∞
r=0 δ
rρtγt/h = (ρtγt/h)/(1− δt). With n replicas,
scaling the discount rate as δ1/nt gives
∑∞
r=0 δ
r/n
t ρtγt/(hn) = (ρtγt/(hn))/(1 − δ1/nt ).
Thus, using this scaling, the agent’s utility for having all his requests satis-
fied decreases as n increases. This seems unnatural. If we instead use the dis-
count rate (1 − (1 − δt)/n), his expected utility is ∑∞r=0(1 − (1 − δt)/n)r(ρtγt/(hn)) =
(ρtγt/(hn))/(1 − (1 − (1 − δt)/n)) = (ρtγt/h)/(1 − δt), which is independent of n, and
seems much more reasonable.
Using the discount rate (1 − (1 − δt)/n) solves one problem, but leaves an-
other. A larger δt is meant to reflect a more patient agent, who gives future
utility a higher weight. However, as the preceding equation shows, increasing
δt also increases total utility. To counteract this, we multiply the total discounted
sum by (1 − δt). This is standard in economics, for example in the folk theorem
for repeated games [29]. With these considerations in mind, the total expected
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utility of agent i given the vector of strategies ~S is
Ui(~S ) = (1 − δτ(i))
∞∑
r=0
(1 − (1 − δτ(i))/n)rE~S [uri ], (2.1)
In modeling the game this way, we have implicitly made a number of as-
sumptions. For example, we have assumed that all of agent i’s requests that are
satisfied give agent i the same utility, and that prices are fixed. We discuss the
implications of these assumptions in Chapter 5.
Our solution concept is the standard notion of an approximate Nash equilib-
rium. As usual, given a strategy profile ~S and agent i, we use (S ′i , ~S −i) to denote
the strategy profile that is identical to ~S except that agent i uses S ′i .
Definition 2.1.1. A strategy S ′i for agent i is an ǫ-best reply to a strategy profile
~S −i for the agents other than i in the game (T, ~f , h,m, n) if, for all strategies S ′′i ,
Ui(S ′′i , ~S −i) ≤ Ui(S ′i , ~S −i) + ǫ.
Definition 2.1.2. A strategy profile ~S for the game (T, ~f , h,m, n) is an ǫ-Nash equi-
librium if for all agents i, S i is an ǫ-best reply to ~S −i. A Nash equilibrium is an
epsilon-Nash equilibrium with ǫ = 0.
As we show in Section 2.3, (T, ~f , h,m, n) has equilibria where agents use a
particularly simple type of strategy, called a threshold strategy. Intuitively, an
agent with “too little” money will want to work, to minimize the likelihood of
running out due to making a long sequence of requests before being able to
earn more money. On the other hand, a rational agent with plenty of money
will think it is better to delay working, thanks to discounting. These intuitions
suggest that the agent should volunteer if and only if he has less than a certain
amount of money. Let sk be the strategy where an agent volunteers if and only if
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the requester has at least 1 dollar and the agent has less than k dollars. Note that
s0 is the strategy where the agent never volunteers. While everyone playing s0
is a Nash equilibrium (nobody can do better by volunteering if no one else is
willing to), it is an uninteresting one.
We frequently consider the situation where each agent of type t uses the same
threshold skt . In this case, a single vector ~k suffices to indicate the threshold of
each type, and we can associate with this vector the strategy ~S (~k) where ~S (~k)i =
skτ(i) (i.e., agent i of type τ(i) uses threshold kτ(i)).
For the rest of this paper, we focus on threshold strategies (and show why it
is reasonable to do so). Whenwe consider the threshold strategy ~S (~k), for ease of
exposition, we assume in our analysis that mhn < ∑t ftkthn. To understand why,
note that mhn is the total amount of money in the system. If mhn ≥
∑
t ftkthn,
then if the agents use a threshold ~S (~k), the system will quickly reach a state
where each agent has kt dollars, so no agent will volunteer. This is equivalent to
all agents using a threshold of 0, and similarly uninteresting.
2.2 Analyzing the Distribution of Wealth
Our main goal is to show that there exists an approximate equilibriumwhere all
agents play threshold strategies. In this section, we examine a more basic ques-
tion: if all agents play a threshold strategy, what happens? We show that there
is some distribution over money (i.e., a distribution that describes what fraction
of people have each amount of money) such that the system “converges” to this
distribution in a sense to be made precise shortly. In addition to providing an
understanding of system behavior that underpins our later results, this result
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also provides a strong guarantee about the stability of the economy.
Suppose that all agents of each type t use the same threshold kt, so we can
write the vector of thresholds as ~k. For simplicity, assume that each agent has
at most kt dollars. We can make this assumption with essentially no loss of
generality, since if someone has more than kt dollars, he will just spend money
until he has at most kt dollars. After this point he will never acquire more than
kt. Thus, eventually the system will be in a state where, for all types t, no agent
of type t has more than kt dollars.
We are interested in the vectors ~xr that can be observed in round r (recall that
xri is the amount of money that agent i has at round r). By assumption, if agent i
has type τ(i), then xri ∈ {0, . . . , kτ(i)}. In addition, since the total amount of money
is hmn,
~xr ∈ XT, ~f ,h,m,n,~k = {~x ∈ N
hn | ∀i.xi ≤ kτi,
∑
i
xi = hmn}.
The evolution of ~xr can be described by a Markov chain MT, ~f ,h,m,n,~k over the
state space XT, ~f ,h,m,n,~k. For brevity, we refer to theMarkov chain and state space as
M and X, respectively, when the subscripts are clear from context. It is possible
to move from state s to state s′ in a single round if, by choosing a particular
agent i to make a request and another agent j to satisfy it, i’s amount of money
in s′ is 1 more than in s; j’s amount of money in s′ is 1 less than in s’, and
all other agents have the same amount of money in s and s′. Therefore, the
probability of a transition from a state ~x to ~y is 0 unless there exist two agents
i and j such that ~yi′ = ~xi′ for all i′ < {i, j}, ~yi = ~xi + 1, and ~y j = ~x j − 1. In this
case, the probability of transitioning from ~x to ~y is the probability of j being
chosen to make a request and i being chosen to satisfy it. Let ∆ ~f ,m,~k denote the
set of probability distributions d on ∪t∈T {t} ×
∏
t{0, . . . , kt} such that for all types
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t,
∑kt
l=0 d(t, l) = ft. We can think of d(t, l) as the fraction of agents of type t that
have l dollars. We can associate each state ~x with its corresponding distribution
d~x. This is a useful way of looking at the system, since we typically just care
about the fraction of people with each amount of money, not the amount that
each particular agent has. We show that, if n is large, then there is a distribution
d∗ ∈ ∆ ~f ,m,~k such that, after a sufficient amount of time, the Markov chain M is
almost always in a state ~x such that d~x is close to d∗. Thus, agents can base their
decisions about what strategy to use on the assumption that they will be in a
state where the distribution of money is essentially d∗.
We can in fact completely characterize the distribution d∗. Given two distri-
butions d, q ∈ ∆ ~f ,m,~k, let
H(d||q) = −
∑
{(t, j):q(t, j),0}
d(t, j) log d(t, j)/q(t, j)
denote the relative entropy of d relative to q (H(d||q) = ∞ if d(t, j) = 0 and q(t, j) , 0
or vice versa); this is also known as the Kullback-Leibler divergence of q from d [20].
If ∆ is a closed convex set of distributions, then it is well known that, for each q,
there is a unique distribution in ∆ that minimizes the entropy relative to q. Since
∆ ~f ,m,~k is easily seen to be a closed convex set of distributions, in particular, this is
the case for ∆ ~f ,m,~k. We now show that there exists a q such that, for n sufficiently
large, the Markov chain M is almost always in a state ~x such that d~x is close
to the distribution d∗
q, ~f ,m ∈ ∆ ~f ,m,~k that minimizes entropy relative to q. (We omit
some or all of the subscripts on d∗ when they are not relevant.) The statement is
correct under a number of senses of “close”. For definiteness, we consider the
Euclidean distance. Given ε > 0 and q, let XT, ~f ,h,m,n,~k,ε,q (or Xε,q, for brevity) denote
the set of states ~x ∈ XT, ~f ,h,m,n,~k such that
∑
(t, j) |d~x(t, j) − d∗q|2 < ε.
Let Irq,n,ε be the random variable that is 1 if d~x
r
∈ Xε,q, and 0 otherwise.
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Theorem 2.2.1. For all games (T, ~f , h,m, 1), all vectors ~k of thresholds, and all ε > 0,
there exist q ∈ ∆ ~f ,m,~k and nε such that, for all n > nε, there exists a round r
∗ such that,
for all r > r∗, we have Pr(Irq,n,ε = 1) > 1 − ε.
The proof of Theorem 2.2.1 can be found in Appendix A.1. One interesting
special case of the theorem is when there exist β, χ, and ρ such that for all types
t, βt = β, χt = χ, and ρt = ρ. In this case q is the distribution q(t, j) = ft/(kt +1) (i.e.,
q is uniform within each type t). We sketch the proof for this special case here.
Proof. (Sketch) Using standard techniques, we can show that our Markov Chain
has a limit distribution π such that for all ~y, limr→∞ Pr(~xr = ~y) = π(~y). Let T~x~y denote
the probability of transitioning from state ~x to state ~y. It is easily verified by
an explicit computation of the transition probabilities that (in this special case)
T~x~y = T~y~x. It is well known that this symmetry implies that π is the uniform
distribution [64]. Thus, after a sufficient amount of time, the distribution of ~xr
will be arbitrarily close to uniform.
Since, for large r, Pr(~xr = ~y) is approximately 1 / |X|, the probability of ~xr being
in a set of states is the size of the set divided by the total number of states. Using
a straightforward combinatorial argument, it can be shown that the fraction of
states not in Xε,q is bounded by p(n)/ecn, where p is a polynomial. This fraction
goes to 0 as n gets large. Thus, for sufficiently large n, Pr(Irq,n,ε = 1) > 1 − ε. 
The last portion of the proof sketch is actually a standard technique from
statistical mechanics that involves showing that there is a concentration phenom-
enon around the maximum entropy distribution [46]. In this special case, when
π is the uniform distribution, the number of states corresponding to a particu-
lar distribution d is proportional to enH(d) (where H here is the standard entropy
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function). In general, each state is not equally likely, which is why the general
proof in Appendix A.1 uses relative entropy.
Theorem 2.2.1 tells us that, after enough time, the distribution of money is
almost always close to some d∗, where d∗ can be characterized as a distribu-
tion that minimizes relative entropy subject to some constraints. Let q(t, i) =
(ωt)i/(∑t ∑ktj=0(ωt)i). Then the value of d∗ is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2.1.
d∗(t, i) = ftλ
iq(t, i)∑kt
j=0 λ
jq(t, j) , (2.2)
where λ is the unique value such that
∑
t
∑
i
id∗(t, i) = m. (2.3)
The proof of Lemma 2.2.1 is omitted because it can be easily checked using
Lagrange multipliers in the manner of [46] where the function to be minimized
is the entropy of d∗ relative to q and the constraints are there a ft fraction of the
agents are of type t and the average amount of money is m.
2.3 Existence of Equilibria
We have seen that the system is well behaved if the agents all follow a threshold
strategy; we now want to show that, if the discount factor δ is sufficiently large
for all agents, there is a nontrivial approximate Nash equilibrium where they
do so (that is, an approximate Nash equilibrium where all the agents use sk for
some k > 0.) To understand why we need δ to be sufficiently large, note that
if δ is small, then agents have no incentive to work. Intuitively, if future utility
28
is sufficiently discounted, then all that matters is the present, and there is no
point in volunteering to work. Thus, for sufficiently small δ, s0 is the only equi-
librium. To show that there is a nontrivial equilibrium if the discount factor is
sufficiently large, we first show that, if every other agent is playing a threshold
strategy, then there is an approximate best reply that is also a threshold strat-
egy. Furthermore, we show that the best-reply function is monotone; that is,
if some agents change their strategy to one with a higher threshold, no other
agent can do better by lowering his threshold. This makes our game one with
what Milgrom and Roberts [57] call strategic complementarities. Using results of
Tarski [70], Topkis [73] showed that there are pure strategy equilibria in such
games, since the process of starting with a strategy profile where everyone al-
ways volunteers (i.e., the threshold is ∞) and then iteratively computing the
best-reply profile to it converges to a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This
procedure also provides an efficient algorithm for explicitly computing equilib-
ria.
To see that threshold strategies are approximately optimal, consider a sin-
gle agent i of type t and fix the vector ~k of thresholds used by the other agents.
If we assume that the number of agents is large, what an agent i does has es-
sentially no affect on the behavior of the system (although it will, of course,
affect that agent’s payoffs). In particular, this means that the distribution q of
Theorem 2.2.1 characterizes the distribution of money in the system. This dis-
tribution, together with the vector ~k of thresholds, determines what fraction of
agents volunteers at each step. This, in turn, means that from the perspective of
agent i, the problem of finding an optimal response to the strategies of the other
agents reduces to finding an optimal policy in aMarkov decision process (MDP)
PG,~S (~k),t. The behavior of the MDP PG,~S (~k),t depends on two probabilities: pu and
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pd. Informally, pu is the probability of i earning a dollar during each round if
is willing to volunteer, and pd is the probability that i will be chosen to make
a request during each round. Note that pu depends on m, ~k, and t (although it
turns out that pd depends only on n, the number of agents in the system) and t;
if the dependence of pu on m, ~k, and/or t is important, we add the relevant para-
meters to the superscript, writing, for example, pm,~ku . We show that the optimal
policy for i in PG,~S (~k),t is a threshold policy, and that this policy is an ε-optimal
strategy for G. Importantly, the same policy is optimal independent of the value
of n. This allows us to ignore the exact size of the system in our later analysis.
For many of our later results and discussion, it will be important to under-
stand how pu, pd, and t affect the optimal policy for PG,~S (~k),t, and thus the ε-
optimal strategies in the game. We use this understanding in this section to
show that there exist nontrivial equilibria in Lemma 2.3.3, to show that adding
money increases social welfare in Section 3.1, to understand how agent behav-
iors affect social welfare in Section 3.2, and to identify agent types from their
behavior in Section 3.3.
In the following lemma, whose proof (and the relevant formal definitions)
are deferred to Appendix A.2, Equation (2.4), quantifies the effects of these pa-
rameters. When choosing whether he should volunteer with his current amount
of money, an agent faces a choice of whether to pay a utility cost of αt now in
exchange for a discounted payoff of γt when he eventually spends the resulting
dollar. His choice will depend on how much time he expects to pass before he
spends that dollar, which in turn depends on his current amount of money k and
the probabilities pu and pd. The following lemma quantifies this calculation.
Lemma 2.3.1. Consider the games Gn = (T, ~f , h,m, n) (where T , ~f , h, and m are fixed,
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but n may vary). There exists a k such that for all n, sk is an optimal policy for PGn,~S (~k),t.
The threshold k is the maximum value of κ such that
αt ≤ E[(1 − (1 − δt)/n)J(κ,pu ,pd)]γt, (2.4)
where J(κ, pu, pd) is a random variable whose value is the first round in which an agent
starting with κ dollars, using strategy sκ, and with probabilities pu and pd of earning a
dollar and of being chosen given that he volunteers, respectively, runs out of money.
The following theorem shows that an optimal threshold policy for PG,~S (~k),t is
an ε-optimal strategy for G. In particular, this means that Equation (2.4) allows
us to understand how changing parameters affect an ε-optimal strategy for G,
not just for PG,~S (~k),t.
Theorem 2.3.1. For all games G = (T, ~f , h,m, n), all vectors ~k of thresholds, and all
ε > 0, there exist n∗ε and δ∗ε,n such that for all n > n∗ε, types t ∈ T , and δt > δ∗ε,n, an
optimal threshold policy for PG,~S (~k),t is an ε-best reply to the strategy profile ~S (~k)−i for
every agent i of type t.
We defer the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 to Appendix A.2. While, in this and later
theorems, the acceptable values of δ∗ε,n depend on n, they are independent if, as
we suggest in Section 2.4, the Markov Chain from Section 2.2 is rapidly mixing.
Given a game G = (T, ~f , h,m, n) and a vector ~k of thresholds, Lemma 2.3.1
gives an optimal threshold k′t for each type t. Theorem 2.3.1 guarantees that sk′t
is an ε-best reply to ~S −i(~k), but does not rule out the possibility of other best
replies. However, for ease of exposition, we will call k′t the best reply to ~S −i and
call BRG(~k) = ~k′ the best-reply function. The following lemma shows that this
function is monotone: it is non-decreasing in ~k and non-increasing in m. Along
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the way, we prove that several other quantities are monotone. First, we show
that λ
m,~k, the value of λ from Lemma 2.2.1 given m and
~k, is non-decreasing in m
and non-increasing in ~k. We use this to show that pm,~ku is non-increasing in ~k and
non-decreasing in m. We defer the proof to Appendix A.2.
Lemma 2.3.2. Consider the family of games Gm = (T, ~f , h,m, n) and the strategies
~S (~k), for mhn < ∑t ftkthn. For this family of game, λm,~k is non-decreasing in m and non-
increasing in ~k; pm,~ku is non-decreasing in m and non-increasing in ~k; and the function
BRG is non-decreasing in ~k and non-increasing in m.
Monotonicity is enough to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. Unfor-
tunately, we know that a trivial equilibrium always exists in threshold strate-
gies: all agents choose a threshold of $0, so no agent ever volunteers. To guar-
antee the existence of a nontrivial equilibrium, it is sufficient to show there is
some vector ~k of thresholds such that BRG(~k) > ~k. The following lemma, whose
proof is again deferred to Appendix A.2, shows that we can always find such a
point for sufficiently large δt.
Lemma 2.3.3. For all games G = (T, ~f , h,m, n), there exists a δ∗ < 1 such that if δt > δ∗
for all t, there is a vector ~k of thresholds such that BRG(~k) > ~k.
We are now ready to prove our main theorem: there exists a non-trivial equi-
librium where all agents play threshold strategies greater than zero.
Theorem 2.3.2. For all games G = (T, ~f , h,m, 1) and all ǫ, there exist n∗ǫ and δ∗ǫ,n such
that, if n > n∗ǫ and δt > δ
∗
ǫ,n for all t, then there exists a nontrivial vector ~k of thresholds
that is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Moreover, there exists a greatest such vector.
Proof. By Lemma 2.3.2, BRG is a non-decreasing function on a complete lattice,
so Tarski’s fixed point theorem [70] guarantees the existence of a greatest and
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least fixed point; these fixed points are equilibria. The least fixed point is the
trivial equilibrium. We can compute the greatest fixed point by starting with
the strategy profile (∞, . . . ,∞) (where each agent uses the strategy S∞ of always
volunteering) and considering ǫ-best-reply dynamics, that is, iteratively comput-
ing the ǫ-best-reply strategy profile. Monotonicity guarantees this process con-
verges to the greatest fixed point, which is an equilibrium (and is bound to be
an equilibrium in pure strategies, since the best reply is always a pure strategy).
Since there is a finite amount of money, this process needs to be repeated only
a finite number of times. By Lemma 2.3.3, there exists a ~k such that BRG(~k) > ~k.
Monotonicity then guarantees that BRG(BRG(~k)) ≥ BRG(~k) and similarly for any
number of applications of BRG. If~k∗ is the greatest fixed point of BRG, then~k∗ > ~k.
Thus, the greatest fixed point is a nontrivial equilibrium. 
The proof of Theorem 2.3.2 also provides an algorithm for finding equilibria
that seems efficient in practice: start with the strategy profile (∞, . . . ,∞) and
iterate the best-reply dynamics until an equilibrium is reached.
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Figure 2.1: A hypothetical best-reply function with one type of agent.
There is a subtlety in our results. In general, there may be many equilib-
ria. From the perspective of social welfare, some will be better than others. As
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we show in Section 3.1, strategies that use smaller (but nonzero) thresholds in-
crease social welfare. Consider the best-reply function shown in Figure 2.1. In
the game G in the example, there is only one type of agent, so BRG : N → N.
In equilibrium, we must have must have BR(k) = k; that is, an equilibrium is
characterized by a point on the line y = x. This example has three equilibria,
where all agents play s0, s5, and s10 respectively. The strategy profile where all
agents play s5 is the equilibrium that maximizes social welfare, while s10 is the
greatest equilibrium.
In the rest of this paper, we focus on the greatest equilibrium in all our ap-
plications (although a number of our results hold for all nontrivial equilibria).
This equilibrium has several desirable properties. First, it is guaranteed to be
stable; best-reply dynamics from nearby points converge to it. By way of con-
trast, best-reply dynamics moves the system away from the equilibrium S 5 in
Figure 2.1. Unstable equilibria are difficult to find in practice, and seem unlikely
to be maintained for any length of time. Second, the “greatest” equilibrium is
the one found by the natural algorithm given in Theorem 2.3.2. The proof of
the theorem shows that it is also the outcome that will occur if agents adopt
the reasonable initial strategy of starting with a large threshold and then using
best-reply dynamics. Finally, by focusing on the worst nontrivial equilibrium,
our results provide guarantees on social welfare, in the same way that results
on price of anarchy [65] provide guarantees (since price of anarchy considers the
social welfare of the Nash equilibrium with the worst social welfare).
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2.4 Simulations
Theorem 2.2.1 proves that, for a sufficiently large number n of agents, and after
a sufficiently large number r of rounds, the distribution of wealth will almost al-
ways be close to the distribution that minimizes relative entropy. In this section,
we simulate the game to gain an understanding of how large n and r need to be
in practice. The simulations show that our theoretical results apply even to rela-
tively small systems; we get tight convergence with a few thousand agents, and
weaker convergence for smaller numbers, in very few rounds rounds, indeed, a
constant number per agent.
5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
Number of Agents
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
M
a
x
im
um
D
is
ta
nc
e
Figure 2.2: Maximum distance from minimum relative entropy distribu-
tion over 106 timesteps.
The first simulation explores the tightness of convergence to the distribution
that minimizes relative entropy for various values of n. We used a single type of
agent, with β = ρ = χ = 1, m = 2, and k = 5. For each value of n, the simulation
was started with a distribution of money as close as possible to the distribution
d∗ that minimizes relative entropy to the distribution q defined in Theorem 2.2.1
that characterizes the distribution of money in equilibrium (when the threshold
strategy 5 is used). We then computed the maximum Euclidean distance be-
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tween d∗ and the observed distribution over 106 rounds. As Figure 2.2 shows,
the system does not move far from d∗ once it is there. For example, if n = 5000,
the system is never more than distance .001 from d∗. If n = 25, 000, it is never
more than .0002 from d∗.
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Figure 2.3: Distance from minimum relative entropy distribution with
1000 agents.
Figure 2.2 does show a larger distance for n = 1000, although in absolute
terms it is still small. The next simulation shows that, while the system may
occasionally move away from d∗, it quickly converges back to it. We averaged 10
runs of theMarkov chain, starting from an extreme distribution (every agent has
either $0 or $5), and considered the average time needed to come within various
distances of d∗. As Figure 2.3 shows, after 2 rounds per agent, on average, the
Euclidean distance from the average distribution of money to d∗ is .008; after 3
rounds per agent, the distance is down to .001.
Finally, we considered more carefully how quickly the system converges to
d∗ for various values of n. There are approximately kn possible states, so the
convergence time could in principle be quite large. However, we suspect that
the Markov chain that arises here is rapidly mixing, which means that it will
converge significantly faster (see [51] for more details about rapid mixing). We
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Figure 2.4: Average time to get within .001 of the minimum relative en-
tropy distribution.
believe that the actually time needed is O(n). This behavior is illustrated in
Figure 2.4, which shows that for our example chain (again averaged over 10
runs), after approximately 3n steps, the Euclidean distance between the actual
distribution of money in the system and d∗ is less than .001. This suggests that
we should expect the system to converge in a constant number of rounds per
agent.
37
CHAPTER 3
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
3.1 Social Welfare and Scalability
In this section, we consider a fundamental question faced by system designers:
what is the optimal amount of money and how does it depend on the size of the
system? We discuss how our theoretical results from Sections 2.2 and 2.3 show
that in order to maximize social welfare, the optimal amount of money is some
constant per agent. Thus, a system designer that wants to maximize social wel-
fare should manage the average quantity of money appropriately. However, we
also show that this must be done carefully. Specifically, we show that increasing
the amount of money improves performance up to a certain point, after which
the system experiences a monetary crash. Once the system crashes, the only
equilibrium will be the trivial one where all agents play s0. Thus, optimizing
the performance of the system involves discovering how much money the sys-
tem can handle before it crashes.
In Section 2.1, we define the game using a tuple G = (T, ~f , h,m, n). Thus,
our definition of a game uses the average amount of money m rather than the
equally reasonable total amount of money mhn. The choice is motivated by
our theoretical results. Theorem 2.2.1 shows that the long-term distribution
of money d∗ depends on the average amount of money, but is independent n,
provided it is sufficiently large. Thus, since we normalize δt by the number of
agents in computing utility, the optimal threshold policy for the MDP devel-
oped in Appendix A.2 is also independent of n. Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 show
that such policies constitute an ε-Nash equilibrium. Thus, modulo a technical
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issue regarding the rate of convergence of theMarkov Chain towards its station-
ary distribution, to determine the optimal amount of money for a large system,
it suffices to determine the optimal value of m, the average amount of money
per agent.
We remark that, in practice, it may be easier for the designer to vary the price
of fulfilling a request than to control the amount of money in the system. This
produces the same effect. For example, changing the cost of fulfilling a request
from $1 to $2 is equivalent to halving the amount of money that each agent has.
Similarly, halving the the cost of fulfilling a request is equivalent to doubling the
amount of money that everyone has. With a fixed amount hmn of money, there
is an optimal product hnc of the number hn of agents and the cost c of fulfilling
a request.
This also tells us how to deal with a dynamic pool of agents. Our system can
handle newcomers relatively easily: simply allow them to join with no money.
This gives existing agents no incentive to leave and rejoin as newcomers. (By
way of contrast, in systems where each new agent starts off with a small amount
of money, such an incentive clearly exists.) We then change the price of fulfilling
a request so that the optimal ratio is maintained. This method has the nice
feature that it can be implemented in a distributed fashion; if all nodes in the
system have a good estimate of n, then they can all adjust prices automatically.
(Alternatively, the number of agents in the system can be posted in a public
place.) Approaches that rely on adjusting the amount of money may require
expensive system-wide computations (see [75] for an example), and must be
carefully tuned to avoid creating incentives for agents to manipulate the system
by which this is done.
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Note that, in principle, the realization that the cost of fulfilling a request
can change can affect an agent’s strategy. For example, if an agent expects the
cost to increase, then he may want to defer volunteering to fulfill a request.
However, if the number of agents in the system is always increasing, then the
cost always decreases, so there is never any advantage in waiting. There may be
an advantage in delaying a request, but it is far more costly, in terms of waiting
costs than in providing service, since we assume the need for a service is often
subject to real waiting costs. In particular, many service requests, such as those
for information or computation, cannot be delayed without losing most of their
value.
Issues of implementation aside, we have now reduced the problem of deter-
mining the optimal total amount of money for a large system to that of deter-
mining the optimal average amount of money, independent of the exact number
of agents. Before we can determine the optimal value of m, we have to answer a
more fundamental question: given an equilibrium that arose for some value of
m, how good is it?
Consider a single round of the game with a population of a single type t and
an equilibrium threshold k. If a request is satisfied, social welfare increases by
γt−αt; the requester gains γt utility and the satisfier pays a cost of αt. If no request
is satisfied then no utility is gained. What is the probability that a request will
be satisfied? This requires two events to occur. First, the agent chosen to make
a request must have a dollar, which happens with probability approximately
1 − ζ, where ζ = d∗(t, 0) is the fraction of agents with no money. Second, there
must be a volunteer able and willing to satisfy the request. Any agent who
does not have his threshold amount of money is willing to volunteer. Thus, if
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θ = d∗(t, kt) is the fraction of agents at their threshold, then the probability of
having a volunteer is 1 − (1 − βt)(1−θ)n. We believe that in most large systems this
probability is quite close to 1; otherwise, either βt must be unrealistically small
or θ must be very close to 1. For example, even if β = .01 (i.e., an agent can
satisfy 1% of requests), 1000 agents will be able to satisfy 99.99% of requests. If θ
is close to 1, then agents will have an easier time earning money then spending
money (the probability of spending a dollar is at most 1/n, while for large β the
probability of earning a dollar if an agent volunteers is roughly (1/n)(1/(1− θ))).
If an agent is playing s4 and there are n rounds played a day, this means that for
θ = .9 he would be willing to pay αt today to receive γt over 10 years from now.
For most systems, it seems unreasonable to have δt or γt/αt this large. Thus, for
the purposes of our analysis, we approximate 1 − (1 − βt)(1−θ)n by 1.
With this approximation, we canwrite the expected increase in social welfare
each round as (1 − ζ)(γt − αt). Since Ui(~S ) is normalized by the discount factor,
the total expected social welfare summed over all rounds is also (1−ζ)(γt−αt). If
we have more than one type of agent, the situation is essentially the same. The
equation for social welfare is more complicated because now the gain in welfare
depends on the γ, α, and δ of the agents chosen in that round, but the overall
analysis is the same, albeit with more cases. In the general case,
ζ =
∑
t
d∗(t, 0) (3.1)
Thus our goal is clear: find the amount of money that, in equilibrium,minimizes
ζ.
In general, as the following theorem shows, ζ decreases as m increases. More
specifically, given our assumption that the system is starting at the greatest equi-
librium ~k, increasing m and then following best response dynamics leads to the
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new greatest equilibrium ~k′. As long as ~k′ is non-trivial, ζ
m′,~k′ ≤ ζm,~k.
Theorems 2.2.1, 2.3.1, and 2.3.2 place requirements on the values of n and
δt. Intuitively, the theorems require that the δts is sufficiently large to ensure
that agents are patient enough that their decisions are dominated by long-run
behavior rather than short-term utility, and that n is sufficiently large to ensure
that small changes in the distribution of money do not move it far from d∗. In the
theorems in this section, assume that these conditions are satisfied. To simplify
the statements of the theorems, we use “the standard conditions hold” to mean
that the game G = (T, ~f , h,m, n) under consideration is such that n > n∗ and
δt > δ
∗ for the n∗ and δ∗ needed for the results of Theorems 2.2.1, 2.3.1, and 2.3.2
to apply.
Theorem 3.1.1. Let G = (T, ~f , h,m, n) be such that the standard conditions hold, and
let ~k be the greatest equilibrium for G. Then if m′ > m, the best-reply dynamics in
G′ = (T, ~f , h,m′, n) starting at ~k converge to some ~k′ ≤ ~k that is the greatest equilibrium
of G′. If ~k′ is a nontrivial equilibrium, then ζ
m′,~k′ ≤ ζm,~k.
Proof. Since ~k is an equilibrium, BRG(~k) = ~k. By Lemma 2.3.2, BRG is non-
increasing in m. Thus, ~k = BRG(~k) ≥ BRG′(~k). Applying best-reply dynamics
to BRG′ starting at ~k as in Theorem 2.3.2 gives us an equilibrium ~k′ such that
~k′ ≤ ~k. By Lemma 2.3.2, BRG(~k′′) is non-decreasing in ~k′′, so this is the greatest
equilibrium. Suppose ~k′ is nontrivial. By Equations (2.2) and (3.1),
ζ
m,~k =
∑
t
d∗(t, 0) =
∑
t
ftq(t, 0)∑kt
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q(t, j)
.
Again by Lemma 2.3.2, λ
m,~k is non-decreasing in m and non-increasing in
~k.
Thus, ζ
m′,~k′ ≤ ζm,~k. 
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Theorem 3.1.1 tells us that, as long as the system does not crash, more money
is better. The following corollary tells us that such a crash is an essential fea-
ture; a sufficient increase in the amount of money leads to a monetary crash.
Moreover, once the system has crashed, adding more money does not cause the
system to become “uncrashed.”
Corollary 3.1.1. Consider the family of games Gm = (T, ~f , h,m, n) such that the stan-
dard conditions hold. There exists a critical average amount m∗ of money such that
if m < m∗, then Gm has a nontrivial equilibrium, while if m > m∗, then Gm has no
nontrivial equilibrium. (A nontrivial equilibrium may or may not exist if m = m∗.)
Proof. To see that there is some m for whichGm has no nontrivial equilibrium, fix
m. If there is no nontrivial equilibrium in Gm, we are done. Otherwise, suppose
that the greatest equilibrium in Gm is ~k. Choose m′ >
∑
t ftkt, and let ~k′ be the
greatest equilibrium in Gm′ . By Theorem 3.1.1, ~k′ ≤ ~k. But if ~k′ is a nontrivial
equilibrium then, in equilibrium, each agent of type t has at most k′t ≤ kt dollars.
But then m′ >
∑
t ftkt ≥
∑ ftk′t , a contradiction.
Let m∗ be the infimum over all m for which no nontrivial equilibrium exists in
the game Gm. Clearly, by choice of m∗, if m < m∗, there is a nontrivial equilibrium
in Gm. Now suppose that m > m∗. By the construction of m∗, there exists m′ with
m > m′ ≥ m∗ such that no nontrivial equilibrium exists in Gm′ . Let the greatest
equilibria with m′ and m be ~k′ and ~k, respectively. By Theorem 3.1.1, ~k ≤ ~k′. Thus
~k is also trivial. 
Figure 3.1 shows an example of the monetary crash in the game
({(.05, 1, 1, .95, 1), (.15, 1, 1, .95, 1)}, (.3, .7), 10,m, 100).
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Figure 3.1: Social welfare for various average amounts of money, demon-
strating a monetary crash.
In light of Corollary 3.1.1, the system designer should try to find m∗, the
point where social welfare is maximized. We discuss how she might go about
finding m∗ is practice in Section 3.3. The system designer may wish to choose
the m somewhat less than m∗. Since there will be a crash for any m > m∗, small
changes in the characteristics of the population or mistakes by the designer in
modeling them could lead to a crash if she chooses m too close to m∗.
The phenomenon of a monetary crash is intimately tied to our assumption of
fixed prices. We saw such a crash in practice in the babysitting co-op example. If
the price is allowed to float freely, we expect that, as themoney supply increases,
there will be inflation; the price will increase so as to avoid a crash. However,
floating prices can create other monetary problems, such as speculation, booms,
and busts. Floating prices also impose transaction costs on agents. In systems
where prices would normally be relatively stable, these transaction costs may
well outweigh the benefits of floating prices, so a system designer may opt for
fixed prices, despite the risk of a crash.
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3.2 Dealing with Nonstandard Agents
The model in Section 2.1 defines the utility of standard agents, who value ser-
vice and dislike using their resources to provide it to others. This seems like a
natural description of the way most people use distributed systems. However,
in a real system, not every user will behave they way the designer intends. A
practical system needs to be robust to nonstandard behaviors. In this section,
we show how our model can be used to understand the effects of four interest-
ing types of nonstandard behavior. First, an agent might provide service even
when he will receive nothing in return, behaving as an altruist. Second, rather
than viewing money as a means to satisfy future requests, an agent might place
an inherent value on it and start hoarding it. Third, an agent might create ad-
ditional identities, known as sybils, to try and manipulate the system. Finally,
agents might collude with each other.
The results of this section give a system designer insight into how to design
a scrip system that takes into account (and is robust to) a number of frequently-
observed behaviors.
3.2.1 Altruists
P2P filesharing systems often have large numbers of free riders; they work be-
cause a small number of altruistic users provide most of the files. For example,
Adar and Huberman [2] found that, in the Gnutella network, nearly 50 percent
of responses are from the top 1 percent of sharing hosts. A wide variety of sys-
tems have been proposed to discourage free riding (see Section 1.2). However,
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in our model, unless this system mostly eliminates the altruistic users, adding
such a system will have no effect on rational users.
To make this precise, take an altruist to be someone who always volunteers
to fulfill requests, regardless of whether the other agent can pay. Agent i might
rationally behave altruistically if, rather than suffering a loss of utility when
satisfying a request, i derives positive utility from satisfying it. Such a util-
ity function is a reasonable representation of the pleasure that some people get
from the sense that they provide the music that everyone is playing. For such
altruistic agents, the strategy of always volunteering is dominant. While having
a nonstandard utility function might be one reason that a rational agent might
use this strategy, there are certainly others. For example a naive user of fileshar-
ing software with a good connection might well follow this strategy. All that
matters for the following discussion is that there are some agents that use this
strategy, for whatever reason. For simplicity, we assume that all such agents
have the same type ta.
Suppose that a system has a altruists. Intuitively, if a is moderately large,
they will manage to satisfy most of the requests in the system even if other
agents do no work. Thus, there is little incentive for any other agent to volun-
teer, because he is already getting full advantage of participating in the system.
Based on this intuition, it is a relatively straightforward calculation to determine
a value of a that depends only on the types, but not the number n, of agents in
the system, such that the dominant strategy for all standard agents i is to never
volunteer to satisfy any requests.
Proposition 3.2.1. For all games (T, ~f , h,m, 1) with fta > 0, there exists a value a such
that, if n > a/( ftah), then never volunteering is a dominant strategy for all standard
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agents.
Proof. Consider the strategy for a standard agent i in the presence of a altruists.
Even with no money, agent i will get a request satisfied with probability 1− (1−
βta)a just through the actions of the altruists. Consider a round when agent i is
chosen to make a request. If he has no money (because he never volunteered),
his expected utility is γτ(i)(1 − (1 − βta)a). His maximum possible utility for the
round is γτ(i). Thus, a strategy where he volunteers can increase his utility for a
round by atmost γτ(i)(1−βta)a. Thus, even if the agent gets every request satisfied,
his expected utility can increase by at most
(1 − δτ(i))∑∞r=1(ρτ(i)/hn)γτ(i)(1 − βta)a(1 − (1 − δτ(i))/n))r
= (1 − δτ(i))(ρτ(i)/h)γτ(i)(1 − βta)a(1 − δτ(i))
= (ρτ(i)/h)γτ(i)(1 − βta)a.
Clearly this expression goes to 0 as a goes to infinity. If we take a large enough
that the expression is less than αt for all types t, then the value of having every
future request satisfied is less than the cost of volunteering now, so no agent
will ever volunteer. 
Consider the following reasonable values for our parameters: βt = .01 (so
that each player can satisfy 1% of the requests), γt = 1, αt = .1 (a low but non-
negligible cost), δt = .9999/day (which corresponds to a yearly discount factor
of approximately 0.95), and an average of 1 request per day per player. Then as
long as a > 1145 to ensure that not volunteering is a dominant strategy. While
this is a large number, it is small relative to the size of a large P2P network.
Proposition 3.2.1 shows that with enough altruists, the system eventually ex-
periences a monetary crash, since all agents will use a threshold of zero. How-
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ever, interesting behavior can still arise with smaller numbers of altruists. Con-
sider the situation where an a fraction of requests are immediately satisfied at
no cost without the requester needing to ask for volunteers. Intuitively, these
are the requests satisfied by the altruists, although the following result also ap-
plies to any setting where agents occasionally have a (free) outside option. The
following theorem shows that social welfare is increasing in a.
Let G = ({t}, 1, h,m, n) be a game with a single type for which the standard
conditions hold. Consider the family Ga of games (parameterized by a) that re-
sult from G if a fraction a of requests can be satisfied at no cost. That is, the game
Ga is the same as G, except that if an agent i makes a request, with probability
a, it is satisfied at no cost, and with probability 1 − a, an agent is chosen among
the volunteers to satisfy the request, just as in G, and the i is charged 1 dollar to
have the request satisfied.
Theorem 3.2.1. For the interval of values of a where there is no monetary crash in Ga,
social welfare increases as a increases (assuming that the greatest equilibrium is played
by all agents in Ga).
Proof. An agent’s utility in a round where he makes a request and it is satisfied
at no cost is γt. Since such rounds occur with probability a, by assumption, our
normalization guarantees that the sum of an agent’s expected utility in rounds
where a request is satisfied at no cost is aγt The same analysis as in Section 3.1
shows that the some of an agent’s expected utility in the remaining rounds is
(1 − a)(1 − ζ(a))(γt − αt), where, as before, ζ(a) = d∗(t, 0, a), the equilibrium value
of d∗(t, 0) in the game Ga. Thus, expected utility as a function of a is
aγt + (1 − a)(1 − ζ(a))(γt − αt). (3.2)
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To see that this expression increases as a increases, we would like to take the
derivative relative to a and show it is positive. Unfortunately, ζ(a) may not even
be continuous. Because strategies are integers, there will be regions where ζ(a)
is constant, and then a jump when a critical value of a is reached that causes the
equilibrium to change. At a point a in a region where ζ(a) is constant, ζ′(a) = 0,
so the derivative of Equation (3.2) is γt − (1 − ζ(a))(γt − αt) > 0. Hence, social
welfare is increasing at such points.
Now consider a point a where ζ(a) is discontinuous. Such a discontinutity
occurs when the greatest equilibrium, the greatest value ~k for which BRGa(~k) = ~k,
changes. We show that, for a fixed ~k, BRGa(~k) is non-increasing in a. Since in-
creasing a can only cause the BRGa(~k) to decrease, the discontinuity must be
caused by a change from an equilibrium ~k to a new equilibrium ~k′ < ~k. Fix a
vector ~k of thresholds, and let p~k,m,au be the probability that i will be earn a dollar
in a given round if he is willing to volunteer, given that a fraction a of requests
is satisfied at no cost (so that p~k,m,0u is what we earlier called p
~k,m
u ); we similarly
define p~k,m,ad . It is easy to see that p
~k,m,a
u = (1 − a)p~k,m,0u and p~k,m,ad = (1 − a)p
~k,m,0
d . The
random variable J(κ, pu, pd) in Equation (2.4) describes the first time at which
an agent starting with κ dollars and using the threshold κ while earning a dol-
lar with probability pu and spending a dollar with probability pd reaches zero
dollars. As a increases, p~k,m,au and p
~k,m,a
d both decrease, but the ratio p
~k,m,a
u /p
~k,m,a
d
remains constant. Intuitively, this means that the agent “slows down” his ran-
dom walk on amounts of money by a factor of 1/(1 − a). Thus, the value of the
expectation in Equation (2.4), and hence the right-hand side of Equation (2.4), is
decreasing as a function of a. By Lemma 2.3.1, (BRGa(~k))t is the maximum value
of κ such that Equation (2.4) is satisfied. Decreasing the right-hand side can only
decrease the maximum value of κ, so BRGa(~k) is non-increasing as a function of
49
a.
By Lemma 2.3.2, λ
m,~k is non-increasing in
~k (unless the system crashes). Since,
as we have just shown, if there is a discontinuity at ζ(a) when a increases, the
greatest equilibrium changes at a from ~k to ~k′ < ~k, we must have λ
m,~k′ ≥ λm,~k.
In Equation (2.2) for i = 0, the value of the numerator is independent of λ,
but the denominator with λ
m,~k′ is greater than or equal to the denominator with
λ
m,~k. Thus d∗(t, 0, a) = ζ(a) is non-increasing at a. By Equation (3.2), this means
that expected utility is increasing at a. Thus, in either case, social welfare is
increasing in a. 
Theorem 3.2.1 and Proposition 3.2.1 combine to tell us that a little altruism
is good for the system, but too much causes a crash. Figure 3.2 demonstrates
this phenomenon. As we saw in Section 3.1, such crashes are caused when m,
the average amount of money, is too large. By decreasing m appropriately, even
relatively large values of a can be exploited, as Figure 3.3 shows. The “social
welfare without adjustment” plot is the same data from Figure 3.2, with the
corresponding plot of the amount of money horizontal since m was held fixed.
By decreasing the average amount of money appropriately as the number of
altruists increases, a system designer can increase social welfare while avoiding
a crash.
3.2.2 Hoarders
Whenever a system allows agents to accumulate something, be it work done,
as in SETI@home, friends on online social networking sites, or “gold” in an on-
line game, a certain group of users seems to make it their goal to accumulate
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Figure 3.2: Altruists can cause a crash.
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Figure 3.3: m can be adjusted as a increases.
as much of it as possible. In pursuit of this, they will engage in behavior that
seems irrational. For simplicity here, we model hoarders as playing the strategy
s∞. This means that they will volunteer under all circumstances. Our analysis
would not change significantly if we also required that they never made a re-
quest for work. Our first result shows that, for a fixed money supply, having
more hoarders makes standard agents worse off.
Consider a game G = (T, ~f , h,m, n) such that the standard conditions hold.
Consider the family G fh of games (parameterized by fh) that result from G if a
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fraction fh of agents are hoarders. That is, G fh = (T × {0, 1}, ~f ′, h′,m, n) where at
agent of type (t, 0) is a standard agent of type t, but an agent of type (t, 1) is a
hoarder and always uses the strategy s∞ (his probabilities are still determined
by βt, ρt, and χt). Define ~f ′ by taking f ′(t,0) = (1 − fh) ft and f ′(t,1) = fh ft for all
types t. Let h′ be the smallest multiple of h such that f(t,i)h′ is an integer for all
t and i. (We need to adjust h because otherwise the number of agents in the
base game may not be well defined.) Finally, to account for the changed h, let
δ(t,i) = 1 − (1 − δt)h/h′.
Theorem 3.2.2. In the familyG fh of games, social welfare is non-increasing in fh (if the
greatest equilibrium is played by all agents in G fh).
Proof. Let ~k( fh) denote the greatest equilibrium in G fh . An increase in fh is equiv-
alent to taking some number of standard agents and increasing their strategy
to s∞. It follows from Lemma 2.3.2 that BRG fh is non-decreasing in fh, and so
~κ( fh) is non-decreasing in fh. Again by Lemma 2.3.2, λm,~k( fh) is non-increasing in
fh. Let ζ fh = 1/(1 − fh)∑t d∗((t, 0), 0, fh) be the fraction of non-hoarders with zero
dollars, where d∗((t, 0), 0, fh) is the value of d∗((t, 0), 0) at the greatest equilibrium
of G fh . By Equation (2.2), ζ( fh) is non-decreasing in fh. Thus, social welfare is
non-increasing in fh. 
Hoarders do have a beneficial aspect. As we have observed, a monetary
crash occurs when a dollar becomes valueless, because there are no agents will-
ing to take it. However, with hoarders in the system, there is always someone
whowill volunteer, so there cannot be a crash. Thus, for anym, the greatest equi-
libriumwill be nontrivial and, by Theorem 3.1.1, social welfare keeps increasing
as m increases. So, in contrast to altruism, where the appropriate response was
to decrease m, the appropriate response to hoarders is to increase m. In fact, our
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results indicate that the optimal response to hoarders is to make m infinite. This
is due to our unrealistic assumption that hoarders would use the strategy s∞
regardless of the value of m. There is likely an upper limit on the value of m in
practice, since it is unlikely that hoarders would be willing to hoard scrip if it is
so easily available.
3.2.3 Sybils
Unless identities in a system are tied to a real world identity (for example by
a credit card), it is effectively impossible to prevent a single agent from having
multiple identities [22]. Nevertheless, there are a number of techniques that can
make it relatively costly for an agent to do so. For example, Credence uses cryp-
tographic puzzles to impose a cost each time a new identity wishes to join the
system [76]. Given that a designer can impose moderate costs to sybilling, how
much more need she worry about the problem? In this section, we show that
the gains from creating sybils when others do not diminish rapidly, so mod-
est costs may well be sufficient to deter sybilling by typical users. However,
sybilling is a self-reinforcing phenomenon. As the number of agents with sybils
gets larger, the cost to being a non-sybilling agent increases, so the incentive to
create sybils becomes stronger. Therefore, measures to discourage or prevent
sybilling should be taken early before this reinforcing trend can start. Finally,
we examine the behavior of systems where only a small fraction of agents have
sybils. We show that under these circumstances a wide variety of outcomes are
possible (even when all agents are of a single type), ranging from a crash (where
no service is provided) to an increase in social welfare. This analysis provides
insight into the tradeoffs between efficiency and stability that occur when con-
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trolling the money supply of the system’s economy.
When an agent of type t creates sybils, the only parameter of his type that
may change as a result is χt, if we redefine the likelihood of an agent being
chosen to be the likelihood of the agent or any of his sybils being chosen. For
simplicity, we assume that each sybil is as likely to be chosen as the original
agent, so creating s sybils increases χt by sχt. (Sybils may have other impacts on
the system, such as increased search costs, but we expect these to be minor.)
Increasing χt benefits an agent by increasing his value of ωt and thus pu, his
probability of earning a dollar (see Equation (A.2) in Appendix A.2). When
pu < pd, the agent has more opportunities to spend money than to earn money,
so he will regularly have requests go unsatisfied due to a lack of money. In this
case, the fraction of requests he has satisfied is roughly pu/pd, so increasing pu
by creating sybils results in a roughly linear increase in utility. As Theorem 3.2.3
shows, when pu is close to pd, the increase in satisfied requests is no longer linear,
so the benefit of increasing pu begins to diminish. Finally, when pu > pd, most of
the agent’s requests are being satisfied, so the benefit from increasing pu is very
small. Figure 3.4 illustrates an agent’s utility as pu varies for pd = .0001.1 We
formalize the relationship between pu, pd, and the agent’s utility in the following
theorem, whose proof is deferred to Appendix A.3.
Theorem 3.2.3. Fix a game G and vector of thresholds ~k. Let R~k,t = p
~k,t
u /ptd. In the limit
as the number of rounds goes to infinity, the fraction of the agent’s requests that have
an agent willing and able to satisfy them that get satisfied is (R~k,t − Rkt+1~k,t )/(1 − R
kt+1
~k,t
) if
R~k,t , 1 and kt/(kt + 1) if R~k,t = 1.
1Except where otherwise noted, the remaining figures in this section assume that m = 4,
n = 10000 and that there is a single type of rational agent with α = .08, β = .01, γ = 1, δ = .97,
ρ = 1, and χ = 1. These values are chosen solely for illustration, and are representative of a broad
range of parameter values. The figures are based on calculations of the equilibrium behavior.
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Figure 3.4: The effect of pu on utility
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Figure 3.5: The effect of sybils on utility
Theorem 3.2.3 gives insight into the equilibrium behavior with sybils.
Clearly, if sybils have no cost, then creating as many as possible is a dominant
strategy. However, in practice, we expect there is some modest overhead in-
volved in creating and maintaining a sybil, and that a designer can take steps to
increase this cost without unduly burdening agents. With such a cost, adding a
sybil might be valuable if pu is much less than pd, and a net loss otherwise. This
makes sybils a self-reinforcing phenomenon. When a large number of agents
create sybils, agents with no sybils have their pu significantly decreased. This
makes them much worse off and makes sybils much more attractive to them.
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Figure 3.6: Sybils can improve utility
Figure 3.5 shows an example of this effect. This self-reinforcing quality means
that it is important to take steps to discourage the use of sybils before they be-
come a problem. Luckily, Theorem 3.2.3 also suggests that a modest cost to
create sybils will often be enough to prevent agents from creating them because
with a well chosen value of m, few agents should have low values of pu.
We have interpreted Figures 3.4 and 3.5 as being about changes in χ due to
sybils, but the results hold regardless of what caused differences in χ. For exam-
ple, agents may choose a volunteer based on characteristics such as connection
speed or latency. If these characteristics are difficult to verify and do impact de-
cisions, our results show that agents have a strong incentive to lie about them.
This also suggests that the decision about what sort of information the system
should enable agents to share involves tradeoffs. If advertising legitimately al-
lows agents to find better service or more services they may be interested in,
then advertising can increase social welfare. But if these characteristics impact
decisions but have little impact on the actual service, then allowing agents to
advertise them can lead to a situation like that in Figure 3.5, where some agents
have a significantly worse experience.
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Figure 3.7: Sybils can cause a crash
We have seen that when a large fraction of agents have sybils, those agents
without sybils tend to be starved of opportunities to work (i.e. they have a low
value of pu). However, as Figure 3.5 shows, when a small fraction of agents
have sybils this effect (and its corresponding cost) is small. Surprisingly, if there
are few agents with sybils, an increase in the number of sybils these agents have
can actually result in a decrease of their effect on the other agents. Because agents
with sybils are more likely to be chosen to satisfy any particular request, they are
able to use lower thresholds and reach those thresholds faster than they would
without sybils, so fewer are competing to satisfy any given request. Further-
more, since agents with sybils can almost always pay to make a request, they
can provide more opportunities for other agents to satisfy requests and earn
money. Social welfare is essentially proportional to the number of satisfied re-
quests (and is exactly proportional to it if everyone shares the same values of α
and γ), so a small number of agents with a large number of sybils can improve
social welfare, as Figure 3.6 shows. Note that, although social welfare increases,
some agents may be worse off. For example, for the choice of parameters in this
example, social welfare increases when twenty percent of agents create at least
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two sybils, but agents without sybils are worse off unless the twenty percent
of agents with sybils create at least eight sybils. As the number of agents with
sybils increases, they start competing with each other for opportunities to earn
money and so adopt higher thresholds, and this benefit disappears. This is what
causes the discontinuity in Figure 3.5 when approximately a third of the agents
have sybils.
This observation about the discontinuity also suggests another way to miti-
gate the negative effects of sybils: increase the amount of money in the system.
This effect can be seen in Figure 3.7, where for m = 2 social welfare is very low
with sybils but by m = 4 it is higher than it would be without sybils.
Unfortunately, increasing the average amount of money has its own prob-
lems. Recall from Section 3.1 that, if the average amount of money per agent is
too high, the system will crash. It turns out than just a small number of agents
creating sybils can have the same effect, as Figure 3.7 shows. With no sybils,
the point at which social welfare stops increasing and the system crashes is be-
tween m = 10.25 and m = 10.5. If one-fifth of the agents each create a single sybil,
the system crashes if m = 9.5, a point where, without sybils, the social welfare
was near optimal. Thus, if the system designer tries to induce optimal behavior
without taking sybils into account, the system will crash. Moreover, because of
the possibility of a crash, raising m to tolerate more sybils is effective only if m
was already set conservatively.
This discussions shows that the presence of sybils can have a significant im-
pact on the tradeoff between efficiency and stability. Setting the money supply
high can increase social welfare, but at the price of making the system less sta-
ble. Moreover, as the following theorem shows, whatever efficiencies can be
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achieved with sybils can be achieved without them, at least if there is only one
type of agent. In the theorem, we consider a system where all agents have the
same type t. Suppose that some subset of the agents have created sybils, and all
the agents in the subset have created the same number of sybils. We can model
this by simply taking the agents in the subsets to have a new type s, which is
identical to t except that the value of χ increases. Thus, we state our results in
terms of systems with two types of agents, t and s.
Theorem 3.2.4. Suppose that t and s are two types that agree except for the value of
χ, and that χt < χs. If ~k = (kt, ks) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for G = ({t, s}, ~f , h,m, n)
with social welfare w, then there exist h′, m′, and n′ such that ~k′ = (ks) is an ε-Nash
equilibrium for G′h′,m′,n′ = ({t}, {1}, h′,m′, n′) with social welfare greater than w.
We defer proof of Theorem 3.2.4 to Appendix A.3.
The analogous result for systems with more than one type of agent is not
true. Figure 3.5 shows a game with a single type of agent, some of whom have
created two sybils. However, we can reinterpret it as a game with two types
of agents, one of whom has a larger value of χ. With this reinterpretation, Fig-
ure 3.5 shows that social welfare is higher when all the agents are of the type th
with the higher value of χ than when only 40% are. Moreover, if only 40% of
the agents have type th, social welfare would increase if the remaining agents
created two sybils each (resulting in all agents having the higher value of χ).
Note that this situation, where there are two types of agents, of which one has
a higher value of χ, is exactly the situation considered by Theorem 3.2.4. Thus,
the theorem shows that for any equilibriumwith two such types of agents, there
is a better equilibriumwhere one of those types creates sybils so as to effectively
create only one type of agent.
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While situations like this show that it is theoretically possible for sybils to
increase social welfare beyond what is possible to achieve by simply adjusting
the average amount of money, this outcome seems unlikely in practice. It relies
on agents creating just the right number of sybils. For situations where such
a precise use of sybils would lead to a significant increase in social welfare, a
designer could instead improve social welfare by biasing the algorithm agents
use for selecting which volunteer will satisfy the request.
Thus far, we have assumed that when agents create sybils the amount of
money in the system does not change. However, the presence of sybils increases
the number of apparent agents in the system. Since social welfare depends on
the average amount of money per agent, if the system designer mistakes these
sybils for an influx of new users and increases the money supply accordingly,
she will actually end up increasing the average amount of money in the system,
and may cause a crash. This emphasizes the need for continual monitoring of
the system rather that just using simple heuristics to set the average amount of
money, an issue we discuss more in Section 3.3.
3.2.4 Collusion
Agents that collude gain two major benefits. The primary benefit is that they
can share money, which makes them less likely to run out of money (and hence
unable to make a request), and allows them to pursue a joint strategy for de-
termining when to work. A secondary benefit, but important in particular for
larger collusive groups, is that they can satisfy each other’s requests. The effects
of collusion on the rest of the system depend crucially on whether agents are
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able to volunteer to satisfy requests when they personally cannot satisfy the re-
quest but one of their colluding partners can. In a system where a request is for
computation, it seems relatively straightforward for an agent to pass the com-
putation to a partner to perform and then pass the answer back to the requester.
On the other hand, if a request is a piece of a file it seems less plausible that
an agent would accept a download from an unexpected source, and it seems
wasteful to have the chosen volunteer download it for the sole purpose of im-
mediately uploading it. If it is possible for colluders to pass off requests in this
fashion, they are able to effectively act as sybils for each other, with all the con-
sequences discussed in Section 3.2.3. However, if agents can volunteer only for
requests they can personally satisfy, the effects of collusion are almost entirely
positive.
Since we have already discussed the consequences of sybils, we will assume
that agents are able to volunteer only to satisfy requests that they personally
can satisfy. Furthermore, we make the simplifying assumption that agents that
collude are of the same type, because if agents of different types collude their
strategic decisions become more complicated. For example, once the colluding
group has accumulated a certain amount of money, it may wish to have only
members with small values of α volunteer to satisfy requests; or when it is low
on money, it may wish to deny use of money to members with low values of
γ. This results in strategies that involve sets of thresholds rather than a single
threshold. While there seems to be nothing fundamentally different about the
situation, it makes calculations significantly more difficult.
With these assumptions, we now examine how colluding agents will behave.
Because colluding agents sharemoney and types, it is irrelevant whichmembers
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actually perform work and have money. All that matters is the total amount of
money the group has. This means that when the group needs money, everyone
in the group volunteers for a job; otherwise, no one does. Thus, the group es-
sentially acts like a single agent, using a threshold that is somewhat less than
the sum of the thresholds that the individual agents would have used, because
it is less likely that c agents will make ck requests in rapid succession than a sin-
gle agent making k. Furthermore, some requests will not require scrip at all be-
cause they can potentially be satisfied by other members of the colluding group.
When deciding whether the group should satisfy a member’s request or ask for
an outside volunteer to fulfill it, the group must decide whether it should pay
a cost of α to avoid spending a dollar. Since not spending a dollar is effectively
the same as earning a dollar, the decision is already optimized by the threshold
strategy; the group should always attempt to satisfy a request internally unless
it is in a temporary situation where the group is above its threshold.
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Figure 3.8: The effect of collusion on utility
Figure 3.8 shows an example of the effects of collusion on agents’ utilities
as the size of collusive groups increases. As this figure suggests, the effects
typically go through three phases. Initially, the fraction of requests colluders
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satisfy for each other is small. This means that each collusive group must work
for others to pay for almost every request its members make. However, since
they share money, the colluders do not have to work as often as individuals
would. Thus, other agents have more opportunity to work, and every agent’s
pu increases, making all agents better off.
As the number of colluders increases, the fraction of requests they satisfy
internally grows significant. We can think of pd as decreasing in this case, and
view these requests as being satisfied “outside” the scrip system because no
scrip changes hands. This is good for colluders, but is bad for other agents
whose pu is lower, since fewer requests are being made. Even in this range,
non-colluding agents still tend to be better off than if there were no colluders,
because the overall competition for opportunities to work is still lower. Finally,
once the collusive group is large enough, it will have a low pd relative to pu. This
means the collusive group can use a very low threshold, which again begins im-
proving utility for all agents. The analogous situation with sybils is transitory,
and disappears when more agents create sybils. However, with collusion, this
low threshold is an inherent consequence of colluders satisfying each other’s
requests, and so persists and even increases as the amount of collusion in the
system increases. Since collusion is difficult to maintain (the problem of incen-
tivizing agents to contribute is the whole point of using scrip), we would expect
the size of collusive groups seen in practice to be relatively small. Therefore, we
expect that for most systems collusion will make no agent worse off, and some
better off. Note that, as with sybils, the decreased in competition that results
from collusion can also lead to a crash. However, if the system designer is mon-
itoring the system, and encouraging and expecting collusion, she can reduce m
appropriately and prevent a crash.
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These results also suggest that creating the ability to take out loans (with
an appropriate interest rate) is likely to be beneficial. Loans gain the benefits
of reduced competition without the accompanying cost of fewer requests be-
ing made in the system. However, implementing a loan mechanism requires
addressing a number of other incentive problems. For example, whitewashing,
where agents take on a new identity (in this case to escape debts) needs to be
prevented [26].
3.3 Identifying User Strategies
In Section 2.2, we used relative entropy to derive an explicit formula for the dis-
tribution of money d∗ given a game (T, ~f , h, n,m) and vector of strategies ~k. In
this section, we want to go in the opposite direction: given the distribution of
money, we want to infer the strategies ~k, the set of types present T , and the frac-
tion of each type ~f . For those interested in studying the agents of a scrip system,
knowing the fraction of agents using each strategy can provide a window into
the preferences of those agents. For system designers, this knowledge is useful
because, as we show in Section 3.1, how much money the system can handle
without crashing depends on the fraction of agents of each type.
In equilibrium, the distribution of money has the form described in
Lemma 2.2.1. Note that, in general, we do not expect to see exactly this distrib-
ution at any given time, but it follows from Theorem 2.2.1 that, after sufficient
time, the distribution is unlikely to be very far from it. Does this distribution
help us identify the strategies and types of agents?
As a first step to answering this question, given a distribution of money d
64
(where d(i) is the fraction of agents with i dollars) such that d(i) is rational for all
i (this constraint is necessary of d(i) is to represent the fraction of agents with i
dollars in a real system), suppose that the maximum amount of money to which
d gives positive probability is Kd. A vector ~f of length Kd +1 whose components
are all rational numbers, where fi is intuitively the fraction of agents playing the
threshold strategy si, is an explanation of d if there exists a λ such that
d( j) =
∑
i
dλ(i, j),
where
dλ(i, j) = fiλ j/(
i∑
l=0
λl) (3.3)
if j ≤ i and 0 otherwise. Note that Equation (3.3) is very similar to Equation (2.2)
from Lemma 2.2.1. In the following lemma, we show why we call ~f an explana-
tion: given a distribution d and an explanation ~f we can find a game G where
~f is the fraction of agents of each type and d is the equilibrium distribution
of money (by which we mean that the value of d∗ in Lemma 2.2.1 is such that
d(i) = ∑t d∗(t, i)).
Lemma 3.3.1. If ~f is an explanation for d, then there exists a game G = (T, ~f , h,m, n)
and vector~k of thresholds such that~k is an ε-Nash equilibrium forG and the equilibrium
distribution of money is d.
Proof. Let T = {0, . . . , Kd}, h be the minimum integer such that hd(i) is an integer
for all i, m =
∑
i id(i), and ~k be such that ki = i. For each type i, choose βi, χi, and
ρi arbitrarily, subject to the constraint that βχ/ρ = 1 (so that, by definition, ωi = 1
for all types i). Finally, choose an arbitrary n.
By Lemma 2.3.1, for any n, an optimal threshold policy in the MDP PG,~S (~k),i
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for an agent of type i is sκ, where κ is the maximum value such that
αt ≤ E[(1 − (1 − δt)/n)J(κ,pu ,pd)]γt. (2.4)
Fix δi and γi, and let g(κ) be the sequence of values of the right hand side of
Equation (2.4) for natural numbers κ. Recall that the random variable J(κ, pu, pd)
represents the round atwhich an agent starting with k dollars runs out of money.
Since J(0, pu, pd) = 0 for all histories, g(0) = γt. The time at which an agent runs
out of money is increasing in his initial amount of money. Thus, J(κ, pu, pd) is
a strictly decreasing function of κ, so g(κ) is also strictly decreasing. Choose αi
such that g(i + 1) < αi < g(i).
Thus, we have established parameters (αi, βi, γi, δi, χi, ρi) for each type i so that
si an optimal policy for agents of type i in the MDP PG,~S (~k),i. By Theorem 2.3.1,
taking n and the δi sufficiently large makes ~k a ε-Nash equilibrium for G. By
Lemma 2.2.1, the equilibrium distribution of money is d. 
In general, there is not a unique explanation of a distribution d. Say that a
distribution of money d is fully-supported if there do not exist i and j such that
i < j, d( j) > 0, and d(i) = 0. For any game G, if all agents play threshold strate-
gies then the resulting distribution will be fully-supported because it has the
form given in Lemma 2.2.1. As the following lemma shows, a fully-supported
distribution can be explained in an infinite number of different ways.
Lemma 3.3.2. If d is a fully-supported distribution of money with finite support, there
there exist an infinite number of explanations of d.
We defer the proof of Lemma 3.3.2 to Appendix A.4.
Lemma 3.3.2 shows that d has an infinite number of explanations.
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Lemma 3.3.1 shows that we can find an (approximate) equilibrium correspond-
ing to each of them. The explanations ~f we construct in the proof of Lemma 3.3.2
seem unnatural; typically fi > 0 for all i. We are interested in a more parsimo-
nious explanation, one that has a small support (i.e., the number of thresholds i
for which fi > 0 is small), for reasons the following lemma makes clear.
Lemma 3.3.3. Let ~f be an explanation for d. If s is the size of the support of ~f , then
any other explanation will have a support of size at least Kd − s.
Proof. Suppose that ~f is an explanation for d. By Lemma 3.3.1, there is a game
G = (T, ~f , h,m, n) and vector ~k of thresholds such that ~k is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
for G and the equilibrium distribution of money is d. Moreover, the proof of
Lemma 3.3.1 shows that we can take T = {0, . . . , Kd}, ki = i, and ωi = 1 for each
type i ∈ T . By Equation (2.2) in Lemma 2.2.1, d∗(t, i) = ftλiq(t, i)/∑ktj=0 λ jq(t, j),
where λ is the (unique) value that satisfies Equation (2.3). We first show that
if fi−1 = 0, then d(i)/d(i − 1) = λ. Since, for all i, ωi = 1, it is immediate from
Equation (A.1) in the appendix that q(i, j) = q(i, j′) for all j and j′. Thus, the q
terms cancel, so d∗(i, j) = fiλ j/∑kil=0 λl. Let bi = fi/∑kil=0 λl; then d∗(i, j) = λ jbi. Only
agents with a threshold of at least j can have j dollars, so
d( j) =
∑
j
d∗(i, j) =
∑
{tl:l≥ j}
d∗(l, j) =
∑
{tl:l≥ j}
blλ j = B jλ j,
where B j =
∑
{tl:l≥i} bl. If fi−1 = 0, then Bi = Bi−1, so d(i)/d(i − 1) = λ.
Since s strategies get positive probability according to ~f , at least k − s of the
ratios d(i)/d(i − 1) with 1 ≤ i ≤ Kd must have value λ. Any other explanation ~f ′
will have different coefficients fi in Equation (3.3), so the value λ′ satisfying it
will also differ (since the requirement that d(Kd) = dλ(Kd, Kd) uniquely defines a
value of λ). This means that the Kd − s ratios with value λ must correspond to
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strategies i such that fi > 0. Thus, the support of any other explanation must be
at least Kd − s. 
If s ≪ Kd, Lemma 3.3.3 gives us a strong reason for preferring the minimal
explanation (i.e., the one with the smallest support); any other explanation will
involve significantly more types of agents being present. For s = 3 and Kd = 50,
the smallest explanation has a support of three thresholds, and thus requires
three types; the next smallest explanation requires at least 47 types. Thus, if the
number of types of agents is relatively small, the minimal explanation will be
the correct one.
The proof of Lemma 3.3.3 also gives us an algorithm for finding this minimal
explanation. Since d(i) = Biλi, taking logs of both sides, log d(i) = log Bi + i logλ.
Because Bi is constant in ranges of i where fti = 0, a plot of log d(i) will be a line
with slope λ in these ranges. Thus, the minimal explanation can be found by
finding the minimum number of lines of constant slope that fit the data. For
a simple example of how such a distribution might look, Figure 3.9 shows an
equilibrium distribution of money for the game
({(.05, 1, 1, .95, 1), (.15, 1, 1, .95, 1)}, (.3, .7), 10, 4, 100)
so the only difference between the types is that it costs the second type three
times as much to satisfy a request) and the equilibrium strategy profile (20, 13).
Figure 3.10 has the same distribution plotted on a log scale. Note the two lines
with the same slope (λ) and the break at 13.
This procedure allows us to infer a distribution of money the minimal expla-
nation of the number of types of agents: the fraction of the population composed
of each type, and the strategy each type is playing. (Note that we cannot dis-
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Figure 3.9: Distribution of money with two types of agents.
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Figure 3.10: Log of the distribution of money with two types of agents.
tinguish multiple types with a shared ωt playing the same strategy.) We would
like to use this information to learn about the preferences of agents: their values
of αt, γt, and δt. Lemma 2.3.1 shows how we can do this. Once we find an expla-
nation, the value of λ determines ptu and ptd for each type t. Then Equation 2.4
puts constraints on the values of αt, βt, and γt. Over time, if T , the set of types,
remains constant, but ~f , n, and m all vary as agents join and leave the system, a
later observation with a slightly would give another equilibrium with new con-
straints on the types of the agents. A number of such observations potentially
reveal enough information to allow strong inferences about agent types.
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Thus far we have implicitly assumed that there are only a small number of
types of agents in a system. Given that a type is defined by six real numbers,
it is perhaps more reasonable to assume that each agent has a different type,
but there is a small number of “clusters” of agents with similar types. For ex-
ample, we might believe that generally agents either place a high value or a
low value on receiving service. While the exact value may vary, the types of
two low-value agents or two high-value agents will be quite similar. We have
also assumed in our analysis that all agents play their optimal threshold strat-
egy. However, computing this optimum may be too difficult for many agents.
Even ignoring computational issues, agents may have insufficient information
about their exact type or the exact types of other agents to compute the optimal
threshold strategy. Both the assumption that there are a few clusters of agents
with similar, but not identical, types and the assumption that agents do not nec-
essarily play their optimal threshold strategy, but do play a strategy close to
optimal, lead to a similar picture of a system, which is one that we expect to
see in practice: we will get clusters of agents playing similar strategies (that is,
strategies with thresholds clustered around one value), rather than all agents in
a cluster playing exactly the same strategy. This change has relatively little im-
pact on our results. Rather than seeing straight lines representing populations
with a sharp gap between them, as in Figure 3.10, we expect slightly curved
lines representing a cluster of similar populations, with somewhat smoother
transitions.
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CHAPTER 4
LEARNING IN SCRIP SYSTEMS
4.1 Introduction to Learning in Distributed Systems
Designers of distributed systems are frequently unable to determine how an
agent in the system should behave, because optimal behavior depends on the
user’s preferences and the actions of others. A natural approach is to have
agents use a learning algorithm. Many multiagent learning algorithms have
been proposed including simple strategy update procedures such as fictitious
play [28], multiagent versions of Q-learning [78], and no-regret algorithms [16].
However, existing algorithms are generally unsuitable for large distributed
systems. In a distributed system, each agent has a limited view of the actions of
other agents. Algorithms that require knowing, for example, the strategy cho-
sen by every agent cannot be implemented. Furthermore, the size of distributed
systems requires fast convergence. Users may use the system for short periods
of time and conditions in the system change over time, so a practical algorithm
for a system with thousands or millions of users needs to have a convergence
rate that is sublinear in the number of agents. Existing algorithms tend to pro-
vide performance guarantees that are polynomial or even exponential. Finally,
the large number of agents in the system guarantees that there will be noise.
Agents will make mistakes and will behave in unexpectedly. Even if no agent
changes his strategy, there can still be noise in agent payoffs. For example, a
gossip protocol will match different agents from round to round; congestion in
the underlying network may effect message delays between agents. A learning
algorithm needs to be robust to this noise.
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While finding an algorithm that satisfies these requirements for arbitrary
games may be difficult, distributed systems have characteristics that make the
problem easier. First, they involve a large number of agents. Having more
agents may seem to make learning harder—after all, there are more possible in-
teractions. However, it has the advantage that the outcome of an action typically
depends only weakly on what other agents do. This makes outcomes robust to
noise. Having a large number of agents also make it less useful for an agent
to try to influence others; it becomes a better policy to try to learn an optimal
response. In contrast, with a small number of agents, an agent can attempt to
guide learning agents into an outcome that is beneficial for him.
Second, distributed systems are often anonymous; it does not matterwho does
something, but rather how many agents do it. For example, when there is con-
gestion on a link, the experience of a single agent does not depend on who is
sending the packets, but on how many are being sent. Anonymous games have
a long history in the economics literature (e.g., [9]) and have been a subject of
recent interest in the computer science literature [21, 31].
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in a distributed system the system
designer controls the game agents are playing. This gives us a somewhat dif-
ferent perspective than most work, which takes the game as given. We do not
need to solve the hard problem of finding an efficient algorithm for all games.
Instead, we can find algorithms that work efficiently for interesting classes of
games, where for us “interesting” means “the type of games a system designer
might wish agents to play.” Such games should be “well behaved,” since it
would be strange to design a system where an agent’s decisions can influence
other agents in pathological ways.
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In Section 4.2, we show that stage learning [27] is robust, implementable with
minimal information, and converges efficiently for an interesting class of games.
In this algorithm, agents divide the rounds of the game into a series of stages. In
each stage, the agent uses a fixed strategy except that he occasionally explores.
At the end of a stage, the agent chooses as his strategy for the next stage what-
ever strategy had the highest average reward in the current stage. We prove
that, under appropriate conditions, a large system of stage learners will follow
(approximate) best-reply dynamics despite errors and exploration.
For games where best-reply dynamics converge, our theorem guarantees
that learners will play an approximate Nash equilibrium. In contrast to pre-
vious results where the convergence guarantee scales poorly with the number
of agents, our theorem guarantees convergence in a finite amount of time with
an infinite number of agents. While the assumption that best-reply dynamics
converge is a strong one, many interesting games converge under best-reply
dynamics, including dominance solvable games and games with monotone best
replies. Marden et al. [53] have observed that convergence of best-reply dynam-
ics is often a property of games that humans design. Moreover, convergence of
best-reply dynamics is a weaker assumption than a common assumption made
in the mechanism design literature, that the games of interest have dominant
strategies (each agent has a strategy that is optimal no matter what other agents
do).
Simulation results, presented in Section 4.3, show that convergence is fast
in practice: a system with thousands of agents can converge in a few thousand
rounds. Furthermore, we identify two factors that determine the rate and qual-
ity of convergence. One is the number of agents: having more agents makes
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the noise in the system more consistent so agents can learn using fewer obser-
vations. The other is giving agents statistical information about the behavior
of other agents; this can speed convergence by an order of magnitude. Indeed,
even noisy statistical information about agent behavior, which should be rela-
tively easy to obtain and disseminate, can significantly improve performance.
While our theoretical results are limited to stage learning, they provide in-
tuition about why other “well behaved” learning algorithms should also con-
verge. Our simulations, which include two other learning algorithms, bear this
out.
In Section 4.3.3 we demonstrate the effectiveness of stage learning in scrip
systems. Our model of a scrip system from Section 2.1 is large and anonymous,
but it is not a game in the sense used in this chapter. The major issue is that of
state: in a scrip system, play in the current round depends on previous rounds
through the amounts of money agents have. However, best-reply dynamics do
converge, a fact that is central to the proof of Theorem 2.3.2.
Despite this limitation of our theoretical results, we show that stage learning
can be adapted to this setting and that it allows agents to converge to equilib-
rium. Our results also demonstrate that stage learning is robust to factors such
as churn (agents joining and leaving the system) and asynchrony (agents using
stages of different lengths).
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4.2 Theoretical Results
4.2.1 Large Anonymous Games
We are interested in anonymous games with countably many agents. Assuming
that there are countably many agents simplifies the proofs; it is straightforward
to extend our results to games with a large finite number of agents. Our model
is adapted from that of [9]. Formally, a large anonymous game is characterized by
a tuple Γ = (N, A, P, Pr).
• N is the countably infinite set of agents.
• A is a finite set of actions from which each agent can choose (for simplicity,
we assume that each agent can choose from the same set of actions).
• ∆(A), the set of probability distributions over A, has two useful interpre-
tations. The first is as the set of mixed actions. For a ∈ A we will abuse
notation and denote the mixed action that is a with probability 1 as a. In
each round each agent chooses one of these mixed actions. The second
interpretation of ρ ∈ ∆(A) is as the fraction of agents choosing each action
a ∈ A. This is important for our notion of anonymity, which says an agent’s
utility should depend only on howmany agents choose each action rather
than who chooses it.
• G = {g : N → ∆(A)} is the set of (mixed) action profiles (i.e. which action
each agent chooses). Given the mixed action of every agent, we want to
know the fraction of agents that end up choosing action a. For g ∈ G,
let g(i)(a) denote the probability with which agent i plays a according to
g(i) ∈ ∆(A). We can then express the fraction of agents in g that choose
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action a as limn→∞(1/n)∑ni=0 g(i)(a), if this limit exists. If the limit exists for
all actions a ∈ A, let ρg ∈ ∆(A) give the value of the limit for each a. The
profiles g that we use are all determined by a simple random process. For
such profiles g, the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) guarantees that
with probability 1 ρg is well defined. Thus it will typically be well defined
(using similar limits) for us to talk about the fraction of agents who do
something.
• P ⊂ R is a finite set of payoffs agents can receive.
• Pr : A×∆(A) → ∆(P) denotes the distribution over payoffs that results when
the agent performs action a and other agents follow action profile ρ. We
use a probability distribution over payoffs rather than a payoff to model
the fact that agent payoffs may change even if no agent changes his strat-
egy. The expected utility of an agent who performs mixed action s when
other agents follow action distribution ρ is u(s, ρ) = ∑a∈A ∑p∈P ps(a) Pra,ρ(p).
Our definition of Pr in terms of ∆(A) rather than G ensures the game is
anonymous. We further require that Pr (and thus u) be Lipschitz continu-
ous.1 For definiteness, we use the L1 norm as our notion of distance when
specifying continuity (the L1 distance between two vectors is the sum of
the absolute values of the differences in each component). Note that this
formulation assumes all agents share a common utility function.
An example of a large anonymous game is one where, in each round, each
agent plays a two-player game against an opponent chosen at random. Such
randommatching games are common in the literature (e.g., [41]), and the mean-
1Lipschitz continuity imposes the additional constraint that there is some constant K such
that | Pr(a, ρ)−Pr(a, ρ′)|/||ρ− ρ′||1 ≤ K for all ρ and ρ′. Intuitively, this ensures that the distribution
of outcomes doesn’t change “too fast.” This is a standard assumption that is easily seen to hold
in the games that have typically been considered in the literature.
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ing of ”an opponent chosen at random” can be made formal [14]. In such a
game, A is the set of actions of the two-player game and P is the set of payoffs
of the game. Once every agent chooses an action, the distribution over actions
is characterized by some ρ ∈ ∆(A). Let pa,a′ denote the payoff for the agent if he
plays a and the other agent plays a′. Then the utility of mixed action s given
distribution ρ is
u(s, ρ) =
∑
a,a′∈A2
s(a)ρ(a′)pa,a′ .
4.2.2 Best-Reply Dynamics
Given a game Γ and an action distribution ρ, a natural goal for an agent is to play
the action that maximizes his expected utility with respect to ρ: argmaxa∈A u(a, ρ).
We call such an action a best reply to ρ. In a practical amount of time, an agent
may have difficulty determining which of two actions with close expected util-
ities is better, so we will allow agents to choose actions that are close to best
replies. If a is a best reply to ρ, then a′ is an η-best reply to ρ if u(a′, ρ)+ η ≥ u(a, ρ).
There may be more than one η-best reply; we denote the set of η-best replies
ABRη(ρ).
We do not have a single agent looking for a best reply; every agent is trying
to find a one at the same time. If agents start off with some action distribu-
tion ρ0, after they all find a best reply there will be a new action distribution ρ1.
We assume that ρ0(a) = 1/|A| (agents choose their initial strategy uniformly at
random), but our results apply to any distribution used to determine the initial
strategy. We say that a sequence (ρ0, ρ1, . . .) is an η-best-reply sequence if the sup-
port of ρi+1 is a subset of ABRη(ρi); that is ρi+1 gives positive probability only to
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approximate best replies to ρi. A η best-reply sequence converges if there exists
some t such that for all t′ > t, ρt′ = ρt. Note that this is a particularly strong
notion of convergence because we require the ρt to converge in finite time and
not merely in the limit. A game may have infinitely many best-reply sequences,
so we say that approximate best-reply dynamics converge if there exists some η > 0
such that every η-best-reply sequence converges. The limit distribution ρt deter-
mines a mixed strategy that is an η-Nash equilibrium.
Our theorem shows that learners can successfully learn in large anonymous
games where approximate best-reply dynamics converge. The number of stages
needed to converge is determined by the number of best replies needed before
the sequence converges. It is possibly to design games that have long best-reply
sequences, but it practice most games have short sequences. One condition that
guarantees this is if ρ0 and all the degenerate action distributions a ∈ A (i.e., dis-
tributions that assign probability 1 to some a ∈ A) have unique best replies. In
this case, there can be at most |A| best replies before equilibrium is reached. Fur-
thermore, in such games the distinction between η-best replies and best replies
is irrelevant; for sufficiently small η, a η-best reply is a best reply. It is not hard
to show that the property that degenerate strategies have unique best replies is
generic; it holds for almost every game.
4.2.3 Stage Learners
An agent who wants to find a best reply may not know the set of payoffs P, the
mapping from actions to distributions over payoffs Pr, or the action distribution
ρ (and, indeed, ρ may be changing over time), so he will have to use some type
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of learning algorithm to learn it. Our approach is to divide the play of the game
into a sequence of stages. In each stage, the agent almost always plays some
fixed action a, but also explores other actions. At the end of the stage, he chooses
a new a′ for the next stage based on what he has learned. An important feature
of this approach is that agents maintain their actions for the entire stage, so each
stage provides a stable environment in which agents can learn. To simplify our
results, we specify a way of exploring and learning within a stage (originally
described in [27]), but our results should generalize to any “reasonable” learn-
ing algorithm used to learn within a stage. (We discuss what is “reasonable”
in Chapter 5.) In this section, we show that, given a suitable parameter, at the
each stage most agents will have learned a best reply to the environment of that
stage.
Given a game Γ, in each round t agent i needs to select a mixed action si,t.
Our agents use strategies that we denote aǫ , for a ∈ A, where aǫ(a) = 1 − ǫ and
aǫ(a′ , a) = ǫ/(|A| − 1). Thus, with aǫ , an agent almost always plays a, but
with probability ǫ explores other strategies uniformly at random. Thus far we
have not specified what information an agent can use to choose si,t. Different
games may provide different information. All that we require is that an agent
know all of his previous actions and his previous payoffs. More precisely, for
all t′ < t, he knows his action at′(i) (which is determined by si,t′) and his pay-
offs pt′(i) (which is determined by Pr(ai,t′ , ρt′), where ρt′ is the action distribution
for round t′; note that we do not assume that the agent knows ρt′ .) Using this
information, we can express the average value of an action over the previous
τ = ⌈1/ǫ2⌉ rounds (the length of a stage).2 Let H(a, i, t) = {t − τ ≤ t′ < t | at′(i) = a}
be the set of recent rounds in which a was played by i. Then the average value
2The use of the exponent 2 is arbitrary. We require only that the expected number of times a
strategy is explored increases as ǫ decreases.
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is V(a, i, t) = ∑t′∈H(a,i,t) pt′(i)/|H(a, i, t)| if |H(a, i, t)| > 0 and 0 otherwise. While we
need the value of H only at times that are multiples of τ, for convenience we
define it for arbitrary times t.
We say that an agent is an ǫ-stage learner if he chooses his actions as follows.
If t = 0, st is chosen at random from {aǫ | a ∈ A}. If t is a nonzero multiple of τ,
si,t = a(i, t)ǫ where a(i, t) = argmaxa∈A V(a, i, t). Otherwise, si,t = si,t−1. Thus, within
a stage, his mixed action is fixed and at the end of a stage he updates it to use
the action with the highest average value during the previous stage.
The evolution of a game played by stage learners is not deterministic; each
agent chooses a random si,0 and the sequence of at(i) and pt(i) he observes is also
random. However, with a countably infinite set of agents, we can use the SLLN
to make statements about the overall behavior of the game. Let gt(i) = si,t. A run
of the game consists of a sequence of triples (gt, at, pt). The SLLN guarantees that
with probability 1 the fraction of agents who choose a strategy a in at is ρgt(a).
Similarly, the fraction of agents who chose a in at that receive payoff p will be
Pr(a, ρgt)(p) with probability 1.
To make our notion of a stage precise, we refer to the sequence of tuples
(gnτ, anτ, pnτ) . . . (g(n+1)τ−1, a(n+1)τ−1, p(n+1)τ−1) as stage n of the run. During stage n
there is a stationary action distribution that we denote ρgnτ . If si,(n+1)τ = aǫ and
a ∈ ABRη(gnτ), then we say that agent i has learned an η-best reply during stage n
of the run. As the following lemma shows, for sufficiently small ǫ, most agents
will learn an η-best reply.
Lemma 4.2.1. For all large anonymous games Γ, action profiles, approximations η > 0,
and probabilities of error e > 0, there exists an ǫ∗ > 0 such that for ǫ < ǫ∗ and all n, if
all agents are ǫ-stage learners, then at least a 1− e fraction of agents will learn an η-best
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reply during stage n.
Proof. (Sketch) On average, an agent using strategy aǫ plays action a (1 − ǫ)τ
times during a stage and plays all other actions ǫτ/(n−1) times each. For τ large,
the realized number of times played will be close to the expectation value with
high probability. Thus, if ǫτ is sufficiently large, then the average payoff from
each action will be exponentially close to the true expected value (via a standard
Hoeffding bound on sums of i.i.d. random variables), and thus each the learner
will correctly identify an action with approximately the highest expected payoff
with probability at least 1− e. By the SLLN, at least a 1− e fraction of agents will
learn an η-best reply. A detailed version of this proof in a more general setting
can be found in [27]. 
4.2.4 Convergence Theorem
Thus far we have defined large anonymous games where approximate best-
reply dynamics converge. If all agents in the game are ǫ-stage learners, then the
sequence ρˆ0, ρˆ1, . . . of action distributions in a run of the game is not a best-reply
sequence, but it is close. The action used by most agents most of the time in
each ρˆn is the action used in ρn for some approximate best reply sequence.
In order to prove this, we need to define “close.” Our definition is based on
the error rate e and exploration rate ǫ that introduces noise into ρˆn. Intuitively,
distribution ρˆ is close to ρ if, by changing the strategies of an e fraction of agents
and having all agents explore an ǫ fraction of the time, we can go from an ac-
tion profile with corresponding action distribution ρ to one with corresponding
distribution ρˆ. Note that this definition will not be symmetric.
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In this definition, g identifies what (pure) action each agent is using that
leads to ρ, g′ allows an e fraction of agents to use some other action, and gˆ
incorporates the fact that each agent is exploring, so each strategy is an aǫ (the
agent usually plays a but explores with probability ǫ).
Definition 4.2.1. Action distribution ρˆ (e, ǫ)-close to ρ if there exist g, g′, and gˆ ∈ G
such that:
• ρ = ρg and ρˆ = ρgˆ;
• g(i) ∈ A for all i ∈ N;
• ||ρg − ρg′ ||1 ≤ 2e (this allows an e fraction of agents in g′ to play a different
strategy from g);
• for some ǫ′ ≤ ǫ, if g′(i) = a then gˆ(i) = aǫ′ .
The use of ǫ′ in the final requirement ensures that if two distributions are
(e, ǫ)-close then they are also (e′, ǫ′)-close for all e′ ≥ e and ǫ′ ≥ ǫ. As an example
of the asymmetry of this definition, aǫ is (0, ǫ) close to a, but the reverse is not
true. While (e, ǫ)-closeness is a useful distance measure for our analysis, it is
an unnatural notion of distance for specifying the continuity of u, where we
used the L1 norm. The following simple lemma shows that this distinction is
unimportant; if ρˆ is sufficiently (e, ǫ)-close to ρ then it is close according to the
L1 measure as well.
Lemma 4.2.2. If ρˆ is (e, ǫ)-close to ρ, then ||ρˆ − ρ||1 ≤ 2(e + ǫ).
Proof. Since ρˆ is (e, ǫ)-close to ρ, there exist g, g′, and gˆ as in Definition 4.2.1.
Consider the distributions ρg = ρ, ρg′ , and ρgˆ = ρˆ. We can view these three
distributions as vectors, and calculate their L1 distances. By Definition 4.2.1,
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||ρg − ρg′ ||1 ≤ 2e. ||ρg′ − ρgˆ||1 ≤ 2ǫ because an ǫ fraction of agents explore. Thus by
the triangle inequality, the L1 distance between ρ and ρˆ is at most 2(e + ǫ). 
We have assumed that approximate best reply sequences of ρn converge,
but during a run of the game agents will actually be learning approximate best
replies to ρˆn. The following lemma shows that this distinction does not matter if
ρ and ρˆ are sufficiently close.
Lemma 4.2.3. For all η there exists a dη such that if ρˆ is (e, ǫ)-close to ρ, e > 0, ǫ > 0,
and e + ǫ < dη then ABR(η/2)(ρˆ) ⊆ ABRη(ρ).
Proof. Let K be the maximum of the Lipschitz constants for all u(a, ·) and dη =
η/(8K). Then for all ρˆ that are (e, ǫ)-close to ρ and all a, |u(a, ρˆ−u(a, ρ)| ≤ ||ρˆ−ρ||1K ≤
2η/(8K)K = η/4 by Lemma 4.2.2.
Let a < ABRη(ρ) and a′ ∈ argmaxa′∈ABRη(ρ) u(a′, ρˆ). Then u(a, ρ) + η < u(a′, ρ).
Combining this with the above gives u(a, ρˆ) + η/2 < u(a′, ρˆ). Thus a < ABRη/2(ρˆ).

Lemmas 4.2.1 and 4.2.3 give requirements on (e, ǫ). In the statement of the
theorem, we call (e, ǫ) η-acceptable if they satisfy the requirements of both lemmas
for η/2 and all η-best-reply sequences converge in Γ.
Theorem 4.2.1. Let Γ be a large anonymous game where approximate best-reply dy-
namics converge and let (e, ǫ) be η-acceptable for Γ. If all agents are ǫ-stage learners
then, for all runs, there exists an η-best-reply sequence ρ0, ρ1, . . . such that in stage n at
least a 1 − e fraction will learn a best reply to ρn with probability 1.
Proof. ρ0 = ρˆ0, so ρˆ0 is (e, ǫ)-close to ρ. Assume ρˆn is (e, ǫ)-close to ρ. By
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Lemma 4.2.1 at least a 1 − e fraction will learn a η/2-best reply to ρˆn. By
Lemma 4.2.3, this is a η-best reply to ρn. Thus ρˆn+1 will be (e, ǫ)-close to ρn+1. 
Theorem 4.2.1 guarantees that after a finite number of stages, agents will be
close to an approximate Nash equilibrium profile. Specifically, ρˆn will be (e, ǫ)-
close to an η-Nash equilibrium profile ρn. Note that this means that ρˆn is actually
an η′-Nash equilibrium for a larger η′ that depends on η,e,ǫ, and the Lipschitz
constant K.
Our three requirements for a practical learning algorithm were that it re-
quire minimal information, converge quickly in a large system, and be robust
to noise. Stage learning requires only that an agent know his own payoffs, so
the first condition is satisfied. Theorem 4.2.1 shows that it satisfies the other two
requirements. Convergence is guaranteed in a finite number of stages. While
the number of stages depends on the game, in Section 4.2.2 we argued that in
many cases it will be quite small. Finally, robustness comes from tolerating an
e fraction of errors. While in our proofs we assumed these errors were due to
learning, the analysis is the same if some of this noise is from other sources such
as churn or agents making errors. We discuss this issue more in Chapter 5.
4.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we discuss experimental results that demonstrate the practicality
of learning in large anonymous games. Theorem 4.2.1 guarantees convergence
for a sufficiently small exploration probability ǫ, but decreasing ǫ also increases
τ, the length of a stage. Our first set of experiments shows that the necessary
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values of ǫ and τ are quite reasonable in practice While our theorem applies
only to stage learning, the analysis provides intuition as to why a reasonable
algorithm that changes slowly enough that other learners have a chance to learn
best replies should converge as well. To demonstrate this, we also implemented
two other learning algorithms, which also quickly converged.
Our theoretical results make two significant predictions about factors that
influence the rate of convergence. Lemma 4.2.1 tells us that the length of a stage
is determined by the number of times each strategy needs to be explored to get
an accurate estimate of its value. Thus, the amount of information provided
by each observation has a large effect on the rate of convergence. For example,
in a random matching game, an agent’s payoff provides information about the
strategy of one other agent. On the other hand, if he receives his expected payoff
for being matched, a single observation provides information about the entire
distribution of strategies. In the latter case the agent can learn with many fewer
observations. A related prediction is that having more agents will lead to faster
convergence, particularly in games where payoffs are determined by the aver-
age behavior of other agents, because variance in payoffs due to exploration and
mistakes decreases as the number of agents increases. Our experimental results
illustrate both of these phenomena.
The game used in our first set of experiments, like many simple games used
to test learning algorithms, is symmetric. Hopkins [41] showed that many learn-
ing algorithms are well behaved in symmetric games with large populations. To
demonstrate that our main results are due to something other than symmetry,
we also tested our stage learning on an asymmetric game, and observed con-
vergence even with a small population.
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Finally, after exploring stage learning in simple games, we implemented a
variant of stage learning for scrip systems. To demonstrate the applicability of
this approach to real systems, we included experiments where there is churn
(agents leaving and being replaced by new agents) and agents learning at dif-
ferent rates.
4.3.1 A Contribution Game
In our first set of experiments, agents play a contribution game (also called a
Diamond-type search model in [57]). In the contribution game, two agents
choose strategies from 0 to 19, indicating how much effort they contribute to
a collective enterprise. The value to an agent depends on how much he con-
tributes, as well as how much the other agent contributes. If he contributes x
and the contribution of the other agent is y, then his utility is 4xy − (x − 5)3. In
each round of our game, each agent is paired with a random agent and they
play the contribution game.
We implemented three learning algorithms to run on this game. Our imple-
mentation of stage learners is as described in Section 4.2.3, with ǫ = 0.05. Rather
than taking the length of stage τ as 1/ǫ2, we set τ = 2500 to improve perfor-
mance. Our second algorithm is based on that of Hart andMas-Colell [37], with
improvements suggested by Greenwald et al. [32]. This algorithm takes para-
meters M and δ (the exploration probability). We used M = 16 and δ = 0.05.
Our final learning algorithm is Exp3 [5]. We set γ, the exploration probability, to
0.05. This algorithm requires that payoffs be normalized to lie in [0, 1]. Since a
few choices of strategies lead to very large negative payoffs, a naive normaliza-
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Figure 4.1: Stage Learners with Random Matching
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Figure 4.2: Hart and Mas-Colell with RandomMatching
tion leads to almost every payoff being close to 1. For better performance, we
normalized payoffs such that most payoffs fell into the range [0, 1] and any that
were outside were set to 0 or 1 as appropriate.
The results of these three algorithms are shown in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
Each curve shows the distance from equilibrium as a function of the number
of rounds of a population of agents of a given size using a given learning al-
gorithm. The results were averaged over 10 runs. Since the payoffs for nearby
strategies are close, we want our notion of distance to take into account that
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Figure 4.3: Exp3 with Random matching
agents playing 7 are closer to equilibrium (8) than those playing zero. There-
fore, we consider the expected distance of ρ from equilibrium:
∑
a ρ(a)|a − 8|. To
determine ρ, we counted the number of times each action was over the length
of a stage, so in practice the distance will never be zero due to mistakes and
exploration. For ease of presentation, the graph shows only populations of size
up to 100; similar results were obtained for populations up to 5000 agents.
For stage learning, increasing the population size has a dramatic impact.
With two agents, mistakes and best replies to the results of these mistakes cause
behavior to be quite chaotic. With ten agents, agents successfully learn, al-
though mistakes and suboptimal strategies are quite frequent. With one hun-
dred agents, all the agents converge quickly to near equilibrium strategies and
significant mistakes are rare.
Despite a lack of theoretical guarantees, our other two algorithms also con-
verge, although somewhat more slowly. The performance of Exp3 is essentially
identical to stage learning. Hart and Mas-Colell’s algorithm only has asymp-
totic convergence guarantees, and even with optimized tends to converge very
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Figure 4.4: Stage Learning with Average-Based Payoffs
slowly in practice if tuned for tight convergence. So to get it to converge in a rea-
sonable amount of time we tuned the parameters to accept somewhat weaker
convergence (although for the particular game shown here the difference in con-
vergence is not dramatic).
Convergence of stage learning in the random-matching game takes approx-
imately 10,000 rounds, which is too slow for many applications. If a system de-
sign requires this type of matching, this makes learning problematic. However,
the results of Figure 4.4 suggest that the learning could be done much faster if
the system designer could supply agents with more information. This suggests
that collecting statistical information about the behavior of agents may be a crit-
ical feature for ensuring fast convergence. To model such a scenario, consider
a related game where, rather than being matched against a random opponent,
all agents contribute to the same project and their reward is based on the aver-
age contribution of the other agents. The results of stage learning in this game
are shown in Figure 4.4. With so much more information available to agents
from each observation, we were able to cut the length of a stage by a factor of
10. The number of stages needed to reach equilibrium remained essentially the
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Figure 4.5: Stage Learners in a Congestion Game
same. Convergence was tighter as well; mistakes were rare and almost all of the
distance from equilibrium is due to exploration.
4.3.2 A Congestion Game
For a different game, we tested the performance of stage learners in a conges-
tion game. This game models a situation where two agents share a network
link. They gain utility proportional to their transmission rate over the link, but
are penalized based on the resulting congestion they experience. The game is
asymmetric because the two different types of agents place different values on
transmission rate. The game is described in detail in [32].
Figure 4.5 shows that stage learners were able to learn very quickly in
this game, using stages of length 250 even though they were being randomly
matched against a player of the other type. Because the different types of agents
had different equilibrium strategies, the distance measure we use is to treat the
observed distribution of strategies and the equilibrium distribution as vectors
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and compute their L1 distance.
4.3.3 Scrip Systems
To demonstrate how stage learning could be applied in a scrip system, we tested
a variant of stage learners in the model of a scrip system from Section 2.1. Re-
call that, in the model, agents pay other agents to provide them service and in
turn provide service themselves to earn money to pay for future service. Agents
may place different values on receiving service (γ), incur different costs to pro-
vide service (α), discount future utility at different rates (δ), and have different
availabilities to provide service (β). We used a single type of agent with para-
meters γ = 1.0, α = 0.05, δ = 0.9, β = 1, average amount of money per agent
m = 1, and stages of 200 rounds per agent (only one agent makes a request each
round).
This model is not a large anonymous game because whether an agent should
provide service depends on how much money he currently has. Thus, stage
learning as specified doesn’t work, because it does not take into account the
current state of the (stochastic) game. Despite this, we can still implement a
variant of stage learning: fix a strategy during each stage and then at the end
of the stage use an algorithm designed for this game to determine a new strat-
egy that is a best reply to what the agent observed. Our algorithm works by
estimating the agent’s probabilities of making a request and being chosen as a
volunteer in each round, and then uses these probabilities to compute an opti-
mal policy. Figure 4.6 shows that this is quite effective. The distance measure
used is based on directly measuring the distance of the agent’s chosen (thresh-
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Figure 4.6: Stage Learners in a Scrip System
old) strategy from the equilibrium strategy, since unlike the previous games it
is impossible to directly infer the agent’s strategy in each round solely from his
decision whether or not to volunteer. Note that the number of rounds has been
normalized based on the number of agents in Figure 4.6 and later figures; stages
actually lasted ten times as long with 100 agents.
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Figure 4.7: A Scrip System with Churn
Real systems do not have a static population of learning agents. To demon-
strate the robustness of stage learning to churn, we replaced ten percent of the
agents with new agents with randomly chosen initial strategies at the end of
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each period. As Figure 4.7 shows, this has essentially no effect on convergence.
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Figure 4.8: A Scrip System with Different Stage Lengths
Finally, in a real system it is often unreasonable to expect all agents to be
able to update their strategies at the same time. Figure 4.8 shows that having
half the agents use stages of 222 rounds per agent rather than 200 did not have
a significant effect on convergence.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
We have given a formal analysis of a scrip system and have shown that ap-
proximate equilibria exist in threshold strategies and that the distribution of
money in these equilibria is given by relative entropy. As part of our equilib-
rium argument, we have shown that the best-reply function is monotone. This
proves the existence of equilibria in pure strategies and permits efficient algo-
rithms to compute these equilibria. We have also examined some of the prac-
tical implications of these theoretical results. For those interested in studying
the agents of scrip systems, our characterization of equilibrium distribution of
money forms the basis for techniques relevant to inferring characteristics of the
agents of a scrip system from the distribution of money. For a system designer,
our results on optimizing the money supply provide a simple maxim: keep
adding money until the system is about to experience a monetary crash.
We have also seen that our model can be used to understand the effects of
nonstandard agent behavior on a scrip system. It provides insight into the ef-
fects of altruists and hoarders on a scrip system and guidance to system de-
signers for dealing with them (less and more money respectively). Sybils are
generally bad, but can typically be discouraged by imposing a moderate cost
and possibly biasing the process for selecting a volunteer. On the other hand,
collusion tends to be a net benefit and should be encouraged. Indeed, the entire
purpose of the system is to allow users to collude and provide each other with
service despite incentives to free ride.
Our model makes a number of assumptions that are worthy of further dis-
cussion. Some of the simplifying assumptions can be relaxed without signifi-
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cant changes to our results (albeit at the cost of greater strategic and analytic
complexity). At a high level, our results show the system converges to a steady
state when agents follow simple threshold strategies and that there is in fact an
equilibrium in these strategies. If, for example, rather than all requests having
the same value to agent (γt), the value of a request is stochastic, agents might
wish to have thresholds for each type of request. This would allow an agent to
forgo a low-valued request if he is low on money. This makes the space of agent
strategies larger and significantly complicates the proofs in the appendix, but
this high-level characterization still holds.
The most significant assumption we make is that prices are fixed. How-
ever, our results provide insight even if we relax this assumption. With variable
prices, the behavior of the system depends on the value of β, the probability that
an agent can satisfy a request. For large β, where are a large number of agents
who can satisfy each request, we expect the resulting competition to effectively
produce a fixed price, so our analysis applies directly. For small β, where there
are few volunteers for each request, variable prices can have a significant im-
pact.
However, allowing prices to be set endogenously, by bidding, has a number
of negative consequences. For one thing, it removes the ability of the system
designer to optimize the system using monetary policy. In addition, for small β,
it is possible for colluding agents to form a cartel to fix prices on a resource they
control. It also greatly increases the strategic complexity of using the system:
rather than choosing a single threshold, agents need an entire pricing scheme.
Finally, the search costs and costs of executing a transaction are likely to be
higher with variable prices. Thus, we believe that adopting a fixed price or a
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small set of fixed prices is often a reasonable design decision.
We believe there is often a happymedium between a single, permanent fixed
price and prices that change freely from round to round; indeed, our advice to
system designers points naturally toward it. In particular, our advice about how
to optimize the amount of money relies on experimentation and observation to
determine what agents are doing and what their utilities are. This information
then tells the designer how much money she should provide. Since adjusting
the amount of money is equivalent to adjusting prices, the designer could in-
corporate this process into a price setting rule. Depending on the nature of
the system, this could either be done manually over time (if the information is
difficult to gather and analyze) or automatically (if the information gathering
and analysis can itself be automated). From this perspective, a monetary crash,
though real, is not something to be feared. Instead, it is just a strong signal that
the current price, while probably not too far off from a very good price, requires
adjustment. Naturally, this relies on a process that proceeds slow enough that
agents myopically ignore the effects of future price changes in determining their
current action.
Our model provides only the beginning of a full understanding of scrip sys-
tems. Many interesting open questions remain for future work. To name a few:
• Our model makes a number of strong predictions about the agent strate-
gies, distribution of money, and effects of variations in the money supply.
It also provides techniques to help analyze characteristics of agents of a
scrip system. It would be interesting to test these predictions on a real
functioning scrip system to either validate the model or gain insight from
where its predictions are incorrect.
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• In many systems there are overlapping communities of various sizes that
are significantly more likely to be able to satisfy each other’s requests. For
example, in a P2P filesharing system, people are more likely to be able to
satisfy the requests of others who share the same interests. It would be in-
teresting to investigate the effect of such communities on the equilibrium
of our system.
• It seems unlikely that altruism and hoarding are the only two types of
“irrational” behavior we will find in real systems. Are there other major
types that our model can provide insight into? Furthermore, it seems nat-
ural that the behavior of a very small group of agents should not be able
to change the overall behavior of the system. Can we prove results about
equilibria and utility when a small group follows an arbitrary strategy?
This is particularly relevant when modeling attackers. See [1] for general
results in this setting.
We have also explored the problem of how how agents can find equilibria
in a scrip system, as well as in distributed systems more generally. Learning in
distributed systems requires algorithms that are scalable to thousands of agents
and can be implemented with minimal information about the actions of other
agents. Most general-purpose multiagent learning algorithms fail one or both of
these requirements. We have shown here that stage learning can be an efficient
solution in large anonymous games where approximate best-reply dynamics
lead to approximate pure strategy Nash equilibria. Scrip systems seem to satisfy
these assumptions well enough that stage learning works in practice.
Our results also highlight two factors that aid convergence. First, having
more learners often improves performance. With more learners, the noise in-
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troduced into payoffs by exploration and mistakes becomes more consistent.
Second, having more information typically improves performance. Publicly
available statistics about the observed behavior of agents can allow an agent
to learn effectively while making fewer local observations. Our simulations
demonstrate the effects of these two factors, as well how our results generalize
to situations with other learning algorithms, churn, and asynchrony. However,
there are many further issues that merit exploration.
Other Learning Algorithms
Our theorem assumes that agents use a simple rule for learning within each
stage: they average the value of payoffs received. However, there are certainly
other rules for estimating the value of an action; any of these can be used as long
as the rule guarantees that errors can be made arbitrarily rare given sufficient
time. It is also not necessary to restrict agents to stage learning. Stage learning
guarantees a stationary environment for a period of time, but such strict behav-
ior may not be needed or practical. Other approaches, such as exponentially
discounting the weight of observations [32, 54] or Win or Learn Fast [13] allow
an algorithm to focus its learning on recent observations and provide a stable
environment in which other agents can learn.
Other Update Rules
In addition to using different algorithms to estimate the values of actions, a
learner could also change the way he uses those values to update his behavior.
For example, rather than basing his new strategy on only the last stage, he could
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base it on the entire history of stages and use a rule in the spirit of fictitious play.
Since there are games where fictitious play converges but best-reply dynamics
do not, this could extend our results to another interesting class of games, as
long as the errors in each period do not accumulate over time. Another possi-
bility is to update probabilistically or use a tolerance to determine whether to
update (see e.g. [25, 37]). This could allow convergence in games where best-
reply dynamics oscillate or decrease the fraction of agents who make mistakes
once the system reaches equilibrium.
Model Assumptions
Our model makes several unrealistic assumptions, most notably that there are
countably many agents who all share the same utility function. Essentially the
same results holds with a large, finite number of agents, adding a few more
“error terms”. In particular, since there is always a small probability that every
agent makes a mistake at the same time, we can prove only that no more than a
1−e fraction of the agents make errors in most rounds, and that agents spending
most of their time playing equilibrium strategies.
We have also implicitly assumed that the set of agents is fixed. As Figure 4.7
shows, we could easily allow for churn. A natural strategy for newly arriving
agents is to pick a random aǫ to use in the next stage. If all agents do this, it
follows that convergence is unaffected: we can treat the new agents as part of
the e fraction that made a mistake in the last stage. Furthermore, this tells us
that newly arriving agents “catch up” very quickly. After a single stage, new
agents are guaranteed to have learned a best reply with probability at least 1−e.
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Finally, we have assumed that all agents have the same utility function. Our
results can easily be extended to include a finite number of different types of
agents, each with their own utility function, since the SLLN can be applied to
each type of agent. We believe that our results hold even if the set of possible
types is infinite. This can happen, for example, if an agent’s utility depends on
a valuation drawn from some interval. However, some care is needed to define
best-reply sequences in this case.
State
One common feature of distributed systems not addressed in our theoretical
results on scrip systems is state. As in scrip systems, where an agent’s decision
about whether to volunteer depends on how much money he currently has, an
agent’s current state is often an important factor in choosing an optimal action.
In principle, we could extend our framework to games with state: in each
stage each agent chooses a policy to usually follow and explores other actions
with probability ǫ. Each agent could then use some off-policy algorithm (one
where the agent can learn without controlling the sequence of observations;
see [47] for examples) to learn an optimal policy to use in the next stage. One
major problem with this approach is that standard algorithms learn too slowly
for our purposes. For example, Q-learning [78] typically needs to observe each
state-action pair hundreds of times in practice. The low exploration probability
means that the expected |S ||A|/ǫ rounds needed to explore each state action pair
even once is large. Efficient learning requires more specialized algorithms that
can make better use of the structure of a problem. However, the use of spe-
cialized algorithms makes providing a general guarantee of convergence more
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difficult. Another problem is that, even if an agent explores each action for each
of his possible local states, the payoff he receives will depend on the states of
the other agents, and thus the actions they chose. We need some property of
the game to guarantee that this distribution of states is in some sense “well be-
haved.” This is the case with scrip systems, where the states of agents converge
to a distribution defined using relative entropy, but it is not clear how this gen-
eralizes.
Mixed Equilibria
Another restriction of our results is that our agents only learn pure strategies.
Oneway to address this is to discretize themixed strategy space (see e.g. [25]). If
one of the resulting strategies is sufficiently close to an equilibrium strategy and
best-reply dynamics converge with the discretized strategies, then we expect
agents to converge to a near-equilibrium distribution of strategies. We have had
empirical success using this approach to learn to play rock-paper-scissors.
Unexpected and Byzantine Behavior
In practice, we expect that not all agents will be trying to learn optimal behav-
ior in a large system. Some agents may simply play some particular (possibly
mixed) strategy that they are comfortable with, without trying to learn a bet-
ter strategy. Others may be learning but with an unanticipated utility function.
Whatever their reasons, if these sufficiently few such agents are choosing their
strategies i.i.d. from fixed distributions (or at least fixed for each stage), then
our results hold without change. This is because we already allow an e frac-
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tion of agents to make arbitrary mistakes, so we can treat these agents as simply
mistaken. This means that altruists, hoarders, sybils, and collusion can be tol-
erated by the learning algorithm, since in all these cases agents use a consistent
threshold strategy.
We might want to go further, and tolerate agents who do not even follow
a consistent strategy for an entire stage. Tolerating such agents would make
a learning strategy robust to Byzantine behavior. In games with a Lipschitz-
continuous utility function, the actions of a small enough fraction of agents can-
not cause a large change in the expected utilities of other agents. Thus, such
games are typically robust to Byzantine behavior [31].
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.2.1
Given a Markov chain M over a state space X and state s ∈ S, let Ir
~x,~y be the
random variable that is 1 ifM is in state~y at time r and the chain started in state ~x
and 0 otherwise. Then limr→∞ Pr(Ir~x,~y = 1) is the limit probability of being in state
~y given that the Markov chain starts in state ~x. In general, this limit does not
exist. However, there are well-known conditions under which the limit exists,
and is independent of the initial state ~x. A Markov chain is said to be irreducible
if every state is reachable from every other state; it is aperiodic if, for every state
~x, there exist two cycles from ~x to itself such that the gcd of their lengths is 1.
TheoremA.1.1. [64] IfM is a finite, irreducible, and aperiodicMarkov chain over state
space X, then there exists a d such that, for all ~x and ~y ∈ X, limr→∞ Pr(Ir~x,~y = 1) = d.
Thus, if we can show that M is finite, irreducible, and aperiodic, then the
limit distribution exists and is independent of the start state ~x. This is shown in
the following lemma.
Lemma A.1.1. If there are at least three agents, thenM is finite, irreducible, and ape-
riodic and therefore has a limit distribution π.
Proof. M is clearly finite since X is finite. We prove that it is irreducible by
showing that state ~y is reachable from state ~x by induction on the distance w =
∑n
i=1 |xi−yi| (i.e., the sum of the absolute differences in the amount of money each
person has in states ~x and ~y). If z = 0, then ~x = ~y so we are done. Suppose that
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w > 0 and all pairs of states that are less that w apart are reachable from each
other. Consider a pair of states ~x and ~y such that the distance from ~x to ~y is w.
Since w > 0 and the total amount of money is the same in all states, there must
exist i1 and i2 such that xi1 > yi1 and xi2 < yi2 . Thus, in state ~y, i1 is willing to
work (since he has strictly less than the threshold amount of money) and i2 has
money to pay him (since i2 has a strictly positive amount of money). The state ~z
that results from i1 doing work for i2 in state ~y is of distance w− 2 from ~x. By the
induction hypothesis, ~z is reachable from ~x. Since ~y is clearly reachable from ~z, ~y
is reachable from ~x.
Finally, we must show that M is aperiodic. Suppose ~x is a state such that
there exist three agents i1, i2, and i3 where i1 has more than 0 dollars and i2 and
i3 have less than their threshold amount of money. There must be such a state
by our assumption that m is “interesting.” Clearly there is a cycle of length 2
from ~x to itself: i2 does work for i1 and then i2 does work for i1. There is also a
cycle of length 3: i2 does work for i1, i3 does work for i2, then i1 does work for
i3. 
We next give an explicit formula for the limit distribution. Recall that in the
special case discussed in the main text, βt, χt, and ρt were the same for all types,
so the transition probabilities were symmetric and the limit distribution was
uniform. While with more general values they are no longer symmetric, they
still have significant structure that allows us to give a concise description of the
limit distribution.
Lemma A.1.2. For all states ~x of M, let w~x =
∏
i(βτ(i)χτ(i)/ρτ(i))xi , and let Z =
∑
~y w~y.
Then the limit distribution ofM is π(~x) = w~x/Z.
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Proof. Define π by taking π(~x) = w~x/Z, where w~x and Z are as in the statement
of the lemma. If T~x~y is the probability of transitioning from state ~x to state ~y, it
is well known that it suffices to show that π satisfies the detailed balance condi-
tion [64], i.e., π(~x)T~x~y = π(~y)T~y~x for all states ~x and ~y and π is a probability mea-
sure. The fact that π is a probability measure is immediate from its definition.
To check the first condition, let ~x and ~y be adjacent states such that ~y is reached
from ~x by i spending a dollar and j earning a dollar. This means that for the
transition from ~x to ~y to happen, i must be chosen to spend a dollar and j must
be able to work and chosen to earn the dollar. Similarly for the reverse transi-
tion to happen, j must be chosen to spend a dollar and i must be able to work
and chosen to earn the dollar. All other agents have the same amount of money
in each state, and so will make the same decision in each state. Thus the proba-
bilities associated with each transition differ only in the relative likelihoods of i
and j being chosen at each point. These may differ for three reasons: one might
be more likely to be able to satisfy requests (β), to want to make requests (ρ), or
to be chosen to satisfy requests (χ). Thus, for some p, which captures the effect
of other agents volunteering on the likelihood of i and j being chosen, we can
write the transition probabilities as T~x~y = ρτ(i)βτ( j)χτ( j) p and T~y~x = ρτ( j)βτ(i)χτ(i) p.
From the definition of π, we have that
π(~x)
π(~y) =
βτ(i)χτ(i)ρτ( j)
ρτ(i)βτ( j)χτ( j)
=
T~y~x
T~x~y
.
Thus, π(~x)T~x~y = π(~y)T~y~x, as desired. 
Note that for the special case considered in the main text, Lemma A.1.2
shows that the limit distribution is the uniform distribution.
The limit distribution tells us the long run probability of being in a given
state. Theorem 2.2.1 does not mention states directly, but rather the distributions
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of money associated with a state. In order to prove the theorem, we need to
know the probability of being in some state associated with a given distribution.
This is established in the following lemma.
LemmaA.1.3. Let π be the limit distribution from Lemma A.1.2, and let V(d) = H(d)−
H( ~f ) − log Z + ∑t ∑kti=0 id(t, i) logωt (where H is the standard entropy function; that
is, H(d) = ∑t,i d(t, i) log d(t, i)). For all d ∈ ∆ ~f ,m,~k, either π({~x | d~x = d}) = 0 or
F(hn)ehnV(d) ≤ π({~x | d~x = d}) ≤ G(hn)ehnV(d), where F and G are polynomials.
Proof. Before computing the probability of being in such a state, we first com-
pute the number of states. It is possible that there is no state ~x such that d = d~x
(e.g., if hn is odd and d has half the agents with 0 dollars). If there is such a state
~x, each such state has hnd(t, i) agents of type t with i dollars. Thus, the number
of states ~x with d = d~x is the number of ways to divide the agents into groups of
these sizes. Since there are hn ft agents of type t, the number of such states is
∏
t
(
hn ft
hnd(t, 0), . . . , hnd(t, kt)
)
.
To complete the proof, we use the fact (shown in the proof of Lemma 3.11 of
[33]) that
1
F(hn)e
hn ft H(dt) ≤
(
hn ft
hnd(t, 0), . . . , hnd(t, kt)
)
≤ G(hn)ehn ft H(dt),
where F and G are polynomial in hn, and dt is the distribution restricted to a sin-
gle type t (i.e., dt(i) = d(t, i)/∑i d(t, i)). The (generalized) grouping property [20] of
entropy allows us to express H(d) in terms of the entropy of the distributions for
each fixed t, or the H(dt). Because ft = ∑i d(t, i), this has the particularly simple
form H(d) = H( ~f ) + ∑t ftH(dt). Thus, up to a polynomial factor, the number of
such states is ∏
t
ehn ft H(dt)ehn(
∑
t ft H(dt)) = ehn(H(d)−H( ~f ).
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By Lemma A.1.2, each of theses states has the same probability π(~x). Thus,
dropping the superscript ~x on d~x for brevity, the probability of being in such a
state is:
ehn(H(d)−H(
~f ))π(~x) = ehn(H(d)−H( ~f ))
∏
i
(βiχt/ρi)xi/Z
= ehn(H(d)−H( ~f ))Z−hn
∏
i
(ωti)xi
= ehn(H(d)−H(
~f ))Z−hn
∏
t
kt∏
i=0
(ωt)hnid(t,i)
= ehn(H(d)−H(
~f ))Z−hn
∏
t
kt∏
i=0
ehnid(t,i) logωt
= ehn(H(d)−H(
~f )−log Z+∑t ∑kti=0 id(t,i) logωt)
= ehnV(d)

Theorem 2.2.1 says that there exists a q ∈ ∆ ~f ,m,~k (i.e., a probability distribution
on agent types t and amounts of money i) with certain properties. We now
define the appropriate q. Let
q(t, i) = (ωt)i /

∑
t
kt∑
j=0
(ωt) j
 . (A.1)
It is not immediately clear why this is the right choice of q. As the follow-
ing lemma shows, this definition allows us to characterize the distribution that
maximizes the probability of being in a state corresponding to that distribution
(as given by Lemma A.1.3) in terms of relative entropy.
LemmaA.1.4. The unique maximum of V(d) = H(d)−H( ~f )− log Z+∑t ∑kti=0 idti logωt
on ∆ ~f ,m,~k occurs at d∗q.
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Proof. For brevity, we drop the superscript ~x on d and let Y = ∑t ∑i(ωt)i.
argmaxdV(d) = argmaxd(H(d) − H( ~f ) − log Z +
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
id(t, i) logωt)
= argmaxd(H(d) +
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
id(t, i) logωt)
= argmaxd
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[−d(t, i) log d(t, i) + id(t, i) logωt]
= argmaxd
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[−d(t, i) log d(t, i) + d(t, i) log(q(t, i)Y)]
= argmaxd
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[−d(t, i) log d(t, i) + d(t, i) log q(t, i) + d(t, i) log Y]
= argmaxd log Y +
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[−d(t, i) log d(t, i) + d(t, i) log q(t, i)]
= argmind
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
[d(t, i) log d(t, i) − d(t, i) log q(t, i)]
= argmind
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
d(t, i) log d(t, i)
q(t, i)
= argmindH(d||q).
By definition, d∗q minimizes H(d||q). It is unique because H (and thus V) is a
strictly concave function on a closed convex set. 
Lemma A.1.4 tells us that the most likely distributions of money to be ob-
served are those with low relative entropy to q. Among all distributions in ∆ ~f ,m,k,
relative entropy is minimized by d∗q. However, given n, it is quite possible that
d∗q is not d~x for any ~x. For example, if d∗q(t, i) = 1/3 for some t and i, but fthn = 16,
then d~x(t, i) = d∗q(t, i) only if exactly 16/3 agents of type t to have i dollars, which
cannot be the case. However, as the following lemma shows, for sufficiently
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large n, we can always find a d~x that is arbitrarily close to d∗q. For convenience,
we use the 1-norm as our notion of distance.
Lemma A.1.5. For all ǫ, there exists nǫ such that, if n > nǫ , then for some state ~x,
||d~x − d∗q|| < ǫ.
Proof. Given n, we construct d ∈ ∆ ~f ,m,k that is of the form d~x and is close to d∗q in a
number of steps. As a first step, for all t and i, let d1(t, i) be the result of rounding
d∗q(t, i) to the nearest 1/hn (where ties are broken arbitrarily). The function d1
may not be in ∆ ~f ,m,k; we make minor adjustments to it to get a function in ∆ ~f ,m,k.
First, note that wemay not have as is d1(t, i) for all t and i, we∑i d1(t, i) , ft. Since
ft is a multiple of 1/hn, can get a function d2 that satisfies these constraints by
modifying each term d1(t, i) by either adding 1/hn to it, subtracting 1/hn from it,
or leaving it alone. Such a function d2 may still violate the final constraint that∑
t,i id2(t, i) = m. We construct a function d3 that satisfies this constraint (while
continuing to satisfy the constraint that
∑
i d3(t, i) = ft) as follows. Note that if
we increase d2(t, i) by 1/hn and decrease d2(t, j) by 1/hn, then we keep the keep∑
i d2(t, i) = ft, and change
∑
i id2(t, i) by (i − j)/hn. Since each term d2(t, i) is a
multiple of 1/hn and m is a multiple of 1/h, we can perform these adjustments
until all the constraints are satisfied.
The rounding to create d1 changed each d1(t, i) by at most 1/hn, so ||d∗q−d1||1 ≤
(∑t kt + 1)/hn. Since, each term d1(t, i) was changed by at most 1/hn to obtain
d2(t, i), we have ||d1 − d2||1 ≤ (∑t kt + 1)/hn. Let c = maxt(max(kt − m,m)). Each
movement of up to 1/hn in the creation of d1 and d2 altered m by at most c/hn.
Thus at most 2c movements are needed in the creation of d3 for each pair (t, i).
Therefore, ||d2 − d3||1 ≤ (∑t kt + 1)2c/hn. By the triangle inequality, ||d∗q − d3|| ≤
(∑t kt+1)(2c+2)/hn, which isO(1/n). Hence, for nǫ sufficiently large, the resulting
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d3 will always be within distance ǫ of d∗q.
Finally, we need to show that d3 = d~x for some ~x. Each d3(t, i) is a multiple
of 1/hn. There are hn agents in total, so we can find such an ~x by taking any
allocation of money such that d3(t, i)hn agents of type t have i dollars. 
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.2.1. We repeat the statement here for
the reader’s convenience.
THEOREM 2.2.1. For all games (T, ~f , h,m, 1), all vectors ~k of thresholds, and all
ε > 0, there exist q ∈ ∆ ~f ,m,~k and nε such that, for all n > nε, there exists a round r∗ such
that, for all r > r∗, we have Pr(Irq,n,ε = 1) > 1 − ε.
Proof. From Lemma A.1.2, we know that, after a sufficient amount of time, the
probability of being in state ~x will be close to π~x = w~x/Z. Since M converges to
a limit distribution, it is sufficient to show that the theorem holds in the limit as
r → ∞. If the theorem holds in the limit for some ε′ < ε, thenwe can take r large
enough that the L1 distance between the distribution of the chain at time r and
the limit distribution (i.e. treating the distributions as vectors and computing
the sum of the absolute values of their differences) is at most ε − ε′.
The remainder of the proof is essentially that of Theorem 3.13 in [33] (applied
in a very different setting). Let V(d) = H(d) − H( ~f ) − log Z + ∑t ∑kti=0 id(t, i) logωt.
We show there exists a value vL such that, for all states ~x such that d~x is not
within ε of d∗q, we have V(d~x) ≤ vL, and a value vH > vL such that vH = V(d~x) for
some point ~y such that d~y is within distance ε of d∗q. Lemma A.1.3 then shows
that it is exponentially more likely that d~xr = d~y than any distribution d such that
110
V(d) ≤ vL. If ~xr = ~y then Irq,n,ε = 1, and if Irq,n,ε = 0 then V(d~x
r ) ≤ vL, so this suffices
to establish the theorem.
By Lemma A.1.4, the unique maximum of V on ∆ ~f ,m,~k occurs at d∗q. The set
{d ∈ ∆ ~f ,m,~k | ||d∗q − d||2 ≥ ε} is closed. V is a continuous function, so it takes
some maximum vL on this set. Pick some vH such that vL < vH < V(d∗q). By
the continuity of V , there exists an ǫ such that if ||d∗q − d||1 < ǫ then V(d) ≥ vH. By
LemmaA.1.5, for sufficiently large n, there is always some ~x such that ||d∗q−d~x||1 <
ǫ. Thus, for some ~x ∈ Xε,q, V(d~x) ≥ vH.
Pr(Irqn,,ǫ = 1) ≥ Pr(~xr ∈ {~y | d~y = d~x}). By Lemma A.1.3, Pr(Irq,n,ǫ = 1) is at
least 1/F(hn)ehnV(d~x) ≥ 1/F(hn)ehnvH . Now consider a ~y such that Iq,n,ǫ(~y) = 0. By
Lemma A.1.3, the probability that d~xr = d~y is at most G(hn)ehnV(d~y) ≤ G(hn)ehnvL .
There are at most (hn + 1)∑t(kt+1) such points, a number which is polynomial in
hn. Thus, for G′(hn) = G(hn)(hn + 1)∑t(kt+1), the probability that Irq,n,ǫ = 0 is at most
G′(hn)ehnvL . The ratio of these probabilities is at most
G′(hn)ehnvL
1
F(hn) e
hnvH
=
G′(hn)F(hn)
ehn(vH−vL)
.
This is the ratio of a polynomial to an exponential, so the probability of seeing a
distribution of distance greater than ε from d∗q goes to zero as n goes to infinity.

A.2 Proofs from Section 2.3
In this appendix, we provide the omitted proofs from Section 2.3.
The proof of Theorem 2.3.1 relies on modeling the game from the perspec-
tive of a single agent. Consider a vector ~k of thresholds and the corresponding
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strategy profile ~S (~k). Fix an agent i of type t. Assume that all the agents other
than i continue play their part of ~S (~k). What is i’s best response? Since the set
of agents is large, i’s choice of strategy will have (essentially) no impact on the
distribution of money. By Theorem 2.2.1, the distribution of money will almost
always be close to a distribution d∗. Suppose, the distribution were exactly d∗.
Since we know the exact distribution of money and the thresholds used by the
other agents, we can calculate the number of each type of agent that wish to
volunteer and thus the probabilities that our single agent will be able to earn or
spend a dollar. Thus, by assuming the distribution of money is always exactly
d∗, we can model the game from the perspective of agent i as a Markov De-
cision Process (MDP). We show in Lemma A.2.2 that this MDP has an optimal
threshold policy. (Threshold policies are known asmonotone policies in the more
general setting where there are more than two actions.) We then prove that any
optimal policy for theMDP is an ǫ-best reply to the strategies of the other agents
in the actual game.
Taking notation from Puterman [62], we formally define the MDP PG,~S (~k),t =
(S , A, p(· | s, a), r(s, a)) that describes the game where all the agents other than i
are playing ~S (~k)−i and i has type t.
• S = {0, . . . ,mhn} is the set of possible states for the MDP (i.e., the possible
amounts of money compatible with the distribution d∗).
• A = {0, 1} is the set of possible actions for the agent, where 0 denotes not
volunteering and 1 denotes volunteering iff another agent who has at least
one dollar makes a request.
• pu is the probability of earning a dollar, assuming the agent volunteers
(given that all other agents have fixed their thresholds according to ~k and
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the distribution of money is exactly d∗. Each agent of type t′ who wishes
to volunteer can do so with probability βt′ . Assuming exactly the expected
number of agents are able to volunteer, υt′ = βt′( ft′ − d∗(t′, kt′))n agents of
type t′ volunteer. Note that we are disregarding the effect of i in computing
the υt′ , since this will have a negligible effect for large n. Using the υts, we
can express pu as the product of two probabilities: that some agent other
than i who has a dollar is chosen to make a request and that i is the agent
chosen to satisfy it. Thus,
pu =

∑
t′
ρt′( ft′ − d∗(t′, 0))

(
χtβt∑
t′ χt′υt′
)
. (A.2)
• pd is the probability of agent i having a request satisfied, given that agent
i has a dollar. Given that all agents are playing a threshold strategy, if the
total number n of agents is sufficiently large, then it is almost certainly the
case that some agent will always be willing and able to volunteer. Thus,
we can take pd to be the probability that agent i will be chosen to make a
request; that is,
pd =
ρt
n
(A.3)
• r(s, a) is the (immediate) expected reward for performing action a in state
s. Thus, r(s, 0) = γt pd if s > 0; r(0, 0) = 0; r(s, 1) = γt pd − αt pu if s > 0; and
r(0, 1) = −αt pu.
• p(s′ | s, a) is the probability of being in state s′ after performing action a in
state s; p(s′ | s, a) is determined by pu and pd; specifically, p(s+1 | s, 1) = pu,
p(s − 1 | s, a) = pd if s > 0, and the remainder of the probability is on
p(s | s, a) (i.e., p(s | s, a) = 1 − (p(s + 1 | s, 1) + p(s − 1 | s, a)).
• u∗(s) is the expected utility of being in state s if agent i uses the optimal
policy for the MDP PG,~S (~k),t
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• u(s, a) is the expected utility for performing action a in state s, given that
the optimal strategy is followed after this action;
u(s, a) = r(s, a) + δ
mhn∑
s′=0
p(s′ | s, a)u∗(s′).
To prove Theorem 2.3.1, we need two preliminary lemmas about the MDP
PG,~S (~k),t.
Lemma A.2.1. For the MDP PG,~S (~k),t, u
∗(s + 2) + u∗(s) ≤ 2u∗(s + 1).
Proof. The MDP PG,~S (~k),t has an optimal stationary policy [62, Theorem 6.2.10] (a
policy where the chosen action depends only on the current state). Let π be such
a policy. Consider the policy π′ starting in state s + 1 that “pretends” it actually
started in state s and is following π. More precisely, if s0 = s + 1 and s j > 0 for
j = 0, . . . , k, define π′(s0, s1, . . . , sk) = π(sk − 1); otherwise, if j ≤ k is the least index
such that s j = 0, define π′(s0, . . . , sk) = π(sk). Given a history (s0, . . . , sk), j is the
random variable whose value is the minimum i such that si = 0 or ∞ if no such
value exists. The definition of π′ from π creates a bijection between histories that
start in state s+1 and histories that start in state s, such that if h′ corresponds to h,
the probability of history h′ with policy π′ is the same as the probability of h with
policy π. Technically, making the mapping a bijection requires the introduction
of a new state 0′, which intuitively represents the state where the agent has zero
dollars andmissed an opportunity to have a request satisfied last round because
of it. More formally, we let p(0′ | 0, a) = pd and p(s | 0′, a) = p(s | 0, a). With
this change, the probabilities of corresponding histories are the same because
the probability of transitioning from a state to the one “immediately below”
it (where s − 1 is immediately below s, 0′ is immediately below 0, and 0′ is
immediately below itself) is always pd, and the probability of transitioning from
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a state to the one “immediately above” it (where s + 1 is immediately above s,
and 1 is immediately above 0′) is always pu.1
This argument shows that an agent starting with s + 1 dollars “pretending”
to start with s will have the same expected reward each round as an agent who
actually started with s dollars, except during the first round j in a history such
that s j = 0. Thus (treating j as a random variable), we have
u∗(s + 1) ≥ u∗(s) + E[δ jγt].
Similarly, we can use π starting from state s + 2 to define a policy π′′ starting
from state s+ 1, where i “pretends” he has one more dollar and is using π, up to
the first round j′ that he is chosen to make a request with π in a state where he
has no money (in which case he can make the request with π started from s + 2,
but cannot make it with π′′ started from s+ 1); from that point on, he uses π. For
corresponding histories, the utilities of an agent starting with s + 1 dollars and
following π′′ and an agent starting with s+ 2 dollars and following πwill be the
same, except during round j′ the agent following πwill have a request satisfied
but the agent following π′′ will not. Thus,
u∗(s + 1) ≥ u∗(s + 2) − E[δ j′γt].
Since, if i uses π, he will run out of money sooner if he starts with s dollars
than if he starts with s + 2 dollars,
E[δ jγt] > E[δ j′γt].
Thus, u∗(s + 2) + u∗(s) ≤ 2u∗(s + 1). 
1Note that this means that 0′ is immediately below 0 but 1 is immediately above 0′. This
is intended, because 0′ intuitively represents the state where the agent has 0 dollars and had
a request go unsatisfied due to a lack of money in the previous round, so if he then earns a
dollar he will have 1 dollar regardless of whether or not his request of two rounds previous was
satisfied.
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Lemma A.2.2. PG,~S (~k),t has an optimal threshold policy.
Proof. As shown by Puterman [62, Lemma 4.7.1], it suffices to prove that u(s, a)
is subadditive. That is, we need to prove that, for all states s,
u(s + 1, 1) + u(s, 0) ≤ u(s + 1, 0) + u(s, 1). (A.4)
We consider here only the case that s > 0 (the argument is essentially the same
if s = 0). Because s > 0, r(s + 1, a) = r(s, a), so (A.4) is equivalent to
puu∗(s + 2) + pdu∗(s) + (1 − pu − pd)u∗(s + 1) + pdu∗(s − 1) + (1 − pd)u∗(s)
≤ pdu∗(s) + (1 − pd)u∗(s + 1) + puu∗(s + 1) + pdu∗(s − 1) + (1 − pu − pd)u∗(s).
This simplifies to
u∗(s + 2) + u∗(s) ≤ 2u∗(s + 1),
which follows from Lemma A.2.1. 
We can now prove Lemma 2.3.1 and Theorem 2.3.1.
LEMMA 2.3.1. Consider the games Gn = (T, ~f , h,m, n) (where T , ~f , h, and m are
fixed, but n may vary). There exists a k such that for all n, sk is an optimal policy for
PGn,~S (~k),t. The threshold k is the maximum value of κ such that
αt ≤ E[(1 − (1 − δt)/n)J(κ,pu ,pd)]γt, (2.4)
where J(κ, pu, pd) is a random variable whose value is the first round in which an agent
starting with κ dollars, using strategy sκ, and with probabilities pu and pd of earning a
dollar and of being chosen given that he volunteers, respectively, runs out of money.
Proof. Fix n. Suppose that an agent is choosing between a threshold of κ and a
threshold of κ+1. These policies only differ when the agent has κ dollars: he will
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volunteer with the latter but not with the former. If he volunteers when he has
κ dollars and is chosen, he will pay a cost of αt and he will have κ+ 1 dollars. As
in the proof of Lemma A.2.1, we can define a bijection on histories such that, in
corresponding histories of equal probability, an agent who started with κ dollars
and is using sκ will always have one less dollar than an agent who started with
κ + 1 dollars and is using sκ+1, until the first round r in which the agent using
sκ+1 has zero dollars. This means that in round r − 1 the agent using sκ+1 had a
request satisfied but the agent using sk was unable to because he had no money.
Thus, if the agent volunteers when he has κ dollars and pays a cost of αt in the
current round, the expected value of being able to spend that dollar in the future
is E[(1− (1−δt)/n)J(κ+1,pu ,pd)]γt. Since this expectation is strictly increasing in κ (an
agent with more money takes longer to spend it all), the maximum κ such that
Equation (2.4) holds is an optimal threshold policy.
Taking the maximum value of κ that satisfies Equation (2.4) ensures that, for
the n we fixed, we chose the maximum optimal threshold. We now need to
show that this maximum optimal threshold is independent of n, which we do
by showing that the expecting utility of every threshold policy sk is independent
of n. The expected utility of a policy depends on the initial amount of money,
but since an agent’s current amount of money is a random walk whose tran-
sition probabilities are determined by pu and pd, there is a well-defined limit
probability
x∗i = lim
r→∞
Pr(agent has i dollars in round r)
determined by the ratio pu/pd (this is because the limit distribution satisfies the
detailed balance condition: x∗i pu = x
∗
i+1 pd). This distribution has the property
that if the agent starts with i dollars with probability x∗i , then in every round
the probability he has i dollars is x∗i . Thus, in each round his expected utility is
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γpd(1 − x∗0) − αpu(1 − x∗k). We can factor out n to write pu = p′u/n and pd = p′d/n
where p′u and p′d are independent of n. Note that pu/pd = p
′
u/p′d, so the x
∗
i ’s are
independent of n. Thus, we can rewrite the agent’s expected utility for each
round as c/n, where c = γp′d(1 − x∗0) − αp′u(1 − x∗k) is independent of n. Therefore,
the expected utility of sk is
∞∑
r=0
(
1 −
1 − δt
n
)r
c
n
=
c
1 − δt
,
which is independent of n. 
THEOREM 2.3.1. For all games G = (T, ~f , h,m, n), all vectors ~k of thresholds, and
all ε > 0, there exist n∗ε and δ∗ε,n such that for all n > n∗ε, types t ∈ T , and δt > δ∗ε,n, an
optimal threshold policy for PG,~S (~k),t is an ε-best reply to the strategy profile ~S (~k)−i for
every agent i of type t.
Proof. By Lemma A.2.2, PG,~S (~k),t has an optimal threshold policy. However, this
might not be a best reply for agent i in the actual game if the other agents are
playing ~S (~k). PG,~S (~k),t assumes that the probabilities of earning or spending a
dollar in a given round are always exactly pu and pd respectively. Theorem 2.2.1
guarantees only that, in the game, the corresponding probabilities are close to
pu and pd with high probability after some amount of time that can depend on
n. A strategy S for player i in G defines a policy πS for PG,~S (~k),t in the obvious
way; similarly, a policy for the MDP determines a strategy for player i in the
game. The expected utility of πS is close to Ui(S , ~S (~k)−i), but is, in general, not
equal to it, because, as we noted, pu and pd may differ from the corresponding
probabilities in the game. They differ for three reasons: (1) they are close, but
not identical; (2) they are only close with high probability, and (3) they are only
close after some amount of time. As we now show, given ε, the difference in
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the expected utility due to each reason can be bounded by ε/6, so the expected
utility of any strategy is within ε/2 of the value the corresponding policy in
PG,~S (~k),t. Thus, an optimal strategy for the MDP is an ε-best reply.
As we have seen, the probabilities pu and pd are determined by the number
of agents of each type that volunteer (i.e., the expressions υt′ for each type t′).
The distance between d~xr and d∗ bounds how much the actual number of agents
of type t′ that wish to volunteer in round r can differ from υt′/βt′ . Even if exactly
υt′/βt′ agents wish to volunteer for each type t, there might not be exactly υt′
agents who actually volunteer because of the stochastic decision by nature about
who can volunteer and because i cannot satisfy his own requests. However, for
sufficiently large n, the effect on pu and pd from these two factors is arbitrarily
close to zero. Applying Theorem 2.2.1, there exist n1 and r1 such that if there
are at least n1 agents, for all round r > r1, d~x
r
and d∗ are sufficiently close that the
difference between the utility of policy πS ′ in the MDP and Ui((S ′, ~S −i) in rounds
r > r1 where d∗ is sufficiently close is at most ε/6.
Note that the maximum possible difference in utility between a round of the
MDP and a round of the game is γ + α (if agent i spends a dollar rather than
earning one). Applying Theorem 2.2.1 again, for e = ε/6(γ + α), there exist n2
and r2 such that the probability of the distribution not being within e of d∗ is
less than e. Thus, the difference between the expected utility of policy πS ′ in the
MDP and Ui((S ′, ~S −i) in rounds r > r2 where d∗ is not sufficiently close is at most
e(γ + α) = ε/6.
Let n∗ε = max(n1, n2) and r∗ = max(r1, r2). The values of n∗ε and r∗ do not depend
on δ, so we can take δ∗ε,n to be sufficiently close to 1 that the total utility from the
first r∗ rounds is at most ε/6, completing the proof of the theorem. 
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Recall that BRG maps a vector ~k describing the threshold strategy for each
type to a vector ~k′ of best replies.
LEMMA 2.3.2. Consider the family of games Gm = (T, ~f , h,m, n) and the strategies
~S (~k), for mhn < ∑t ftkthn. For this family of game, λm,~k is non-decreasing in m and non-
increasing in ~k; pm,~ku is non-decreasing in m and non-increasing in ~k; and the function
BRG is non-decreasing in ~k and non-increasing in m.
Proof. We first show that that λ
m,~k is monotone in m and
~k. We then show that
pm,~ku is a monotone function of λm,~k and that BRG is a monotone function of p
m,~k
u ,
completing the proof.
We now show that λ
m,~k is non-decreasing in m. Fix a vector of thresholds
~k
and let
g~k(λ) =
∑
t,i
i
ftλiq~k(t, i)∑kt
j=0 λ
jq~k(t, j)
, (A.5)
where q~k is the value of q from Equation (A.1) (we add the subscript ~k to stress
the dependence on ~k). The definition of λ
m,~k in Equations (2.2) and (2.3) in
Lemma 2.2.1 ensures that, for all m, m = g~k(λm,~k). A relatively straightforward
computation shows that g′
~k
(λ) > 0 for all λ. Thus, if m′ > m, g~k(λ) = m, and
g~k(λ′) = m′, we must have λ′ > λ. It follows that λm,~k is increasing in m. (Note
that λ
m,~k is undefined for m ≥
∑
t ftkt, which is why monotonicity holds only for
values of m such that mhn < ∑t ftkt.)
We next show that λ
m,~k is non-increasing in
~k. Since we have a finite set of
types, it suffices to consider the casewhere a single type t∗ increases its threshold
by 1. Let ~k denote the initial vector of thresholds, and let ~k′ denote the vector of
thresholds after agents of type t∗ increase their threshold by 1; that is, kt = k′t for
t , t∗, and k′t∗ = kt∗ + 1.
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The first step in showing that λ
m,~k is non-increasing in
~k is to show that
g~k′(λm,~k) > g~k(λm,~k) = m. We do this by breaking the sum in the definition of
g in Equation (A.5) into two pieces; those terms were t , t∗, and those where
t = t∗.
It follows immediately from Equation (A.1) that there exists a constant c such
that, for all i and t , t∗, we have q~k′(t, i) = cq~k(t, i). It follows from Equation (2.2)
that for all i and t , t∗, since kt = k′t , we have
i
ftλi
m,~k
q~k′(t, i)∑k′t
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k′(t, j)
= i
ftλi
m,~k
cq~k(t, i)∑k′t
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
cq~k(t, j)
= i
ftλi
m,~k
q~k(t, i)∑kt
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k(t, j)
; (A.6)
that is, the corresponding terms in the sum for g~k′(λm,~k) and g~k(λm,~k) are the same
if t , t∗.
Now consider the corresponding terms for type t∗. First observe that for all
i < k′t , ft∗λi
m,~k
q~k′(t∗, i)∑k′
t∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k′(t∗, j)
<
ft∗λi
m,~k
q~k(t∗, i)∑kt∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k(t∗, j)
; (A.7)
the two terms have essentially the same numerator (the use of q~k′ instead of q~k
cancels out as in Equation (A.6)), but the first has a larger denominator because
k′t∗ = kt∗ + 1, so there is one more term in the sum. Since ft∗ =
∑kt∗
i=0 d∗q~k(t
∗, i) =
∑k′
t∗
i=0 d∗q~k′ (t
∗, i), by Equations (2.2) and (2.3),
kt∗∑
i=0
ft∗λi
m,~k
q~k(t∗, i)∑kt∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k(t∗, j)
=
k′t∗∑
i=0
ft∗λi
m,~k
q~k′(t∗, i)∑k′
t∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k′(t∗, j)
. (A.8)
It follows that
k′
t∗∑
i=0
i
ft∗λi
m,~k
q~k′(t, i)∑k′
t∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k′(t, j)
>
kt∗∑
i=0
i
ftλi
m,~k
q~k(t, i)∑kt∗
j=0 λ
j
m,~k
q~k(t, j)
. (A.9)
To see this, note that the two expressions above have the form
∑kt∗+1
i=0 ici and∑kt∗
i=0 idi, respectively. By Equation (A.8),
∑kt∗+1
i=0 ci =
∑kt∗
i=0 di = ft∗ ; by Equa-
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tion (A.7), ci < di for i = 0, . . . , kt∗ . Thus, in going from the right side to the
left side, weight is being transferred from lower terms to kt∗ + 1.
Combining Equations (A.6) and (A.9) gives us g~k′(λm,~k) > g~k(λm,~k) = m, as
desired. Since g~k′(λm,~k′) = m, by definition, it follows that g~k′(λm,~k) > g~k′(λm,~k′).
Since, as shown above, g ~k′′ is an increasing function, it follows that λm,~k > λm,~k′ .
Thus, λ
m,~k is decreasing in
~k.
We now show that the monotonicity of λ
m,~k implies the monotonicity of p
m,~k
u .
To do this, we show that, for all types t, pm,~ku = pdλm,~kωt. Since ωt and pd are
independent of m and ~k, it then follows that the monotonicity of λ
m,~k implies the
monotonicity of pm,~ku . (Recall that ωt = βtχt/ρt was defined in Section 2.1.)
Fix a type t′. Then, dropping superscripts and subscripts on pu, d, and λ for
brevity, we have the following sequence of equalities (where the explanation for
some of these lines is given following the equations):
pu =

∑
t
ρT ( ft − d(t, 0)

(
χt′βt′
n
∑
t χtβt( ft − d(t, kt))
)
(A.10)
=

∑
t
∑kt
i=1 ρtd(t, i)∑
t
∑kt−1
i=0 χtβtd(t, i)

(
χt′βt′
n
)
(A.11)
=

∑
t
∑kt−1
i=0 ρtλωtd(t, i)∑
t
∑kt−1
i=0 χtβtd(t, i)

(
χt′βt′
n
)
(A.12)
= λ

∑
t
∑kt−1
i=0 χtβtd(t, i)∑
t
∑kt−1
i=0 χtβtd(t, i)
 (ωt′ pd) (A.13)
= λωt′ pd
Equation (A.10) is just the definition of pu from Equation (A.2). Equation (A.11)
follows from the observation that, by Equation (2.2), ft = ∑i d(t, i). Equa-
tion (A.12) follows from the observation that, again by Equation (2.2), d(t, i) =
ωtλd(t, i−1). Equation (A.13) follows from the definitions of ωt and pd (see Equa-
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tion (A.3)). Thus, as required, pm,~ku = pdλm,~kωt.
Finally, we show that the monotonicity of pm,~ku implies the monotonicity of
BRG. Let ~k′′ = BRG(~k). By Lemma 2.3.1, k′′t is the maximum value of κ such that
αt ≤ E[(1 − (1 − δt)/n)J(κ,p
m,~k
u ,pd)]γt.
We (implicitly) defined the randomvariable J(κ, pu, pd) as a function on histories.
Instead, we can define J(κ, pu, pd) as a function on random bitstrings (which
intuitively determine a history). With this redefinition, it is clear that, if pu < p′u,
for all bitstrings b, we have J(κ, pu, pd)(b) < J(κ, p′u, pd)(b). It easily follows that
E[(1 − (1 − δt)J(κ,p′u ,pd)] < E[(1 − (1 − δt)J(κ,pu ,pd)]
for all κ. Thus, the monotonicity of BRG follows from the monotonicity of pm,
~k
u .

LEMMA 2.3.3. For all games G = (T, ~f , h,m, n), there exists a δ∗ < 1 such that if
δt > δ
∗ for all t, there is a vector ~k of thresholds such that BRG(~k) > ~k.
Proof. Take ~k to be such that kt = ⌈m⌉ + 1 for each type t. Then by Theorem 2.3.1,
there exists a ~k′ such that BRG(~k) = ~k′. By Lemma 2.3.1, k′t is the maximum value
of κ such that
αt ≤ E[(1 − (1 − δt)/n)J(κ,p
~k
u ,pd)]γt. (2.4)
As δt approaches 1, E[(1 − (1 − δt)/n)J(κ,p
~k
u ,pd)] approaches 1, and so the right hand
side of Equation (2.4) approaches γt. For any standard agent, αt < γt. Thus, there
exists a δt such that
αt ≤ E[(1 − (1 − δt)/n)J(kt ,p
~k
u,pd)]γt.
For this choice of δt, we must have k′t ≥ kt + 1 > kt. Take δ∗ = maxt δt. 
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A.3 Proofs from Section 3.2
THEOREM 3.2.3. Fix a game G and vector of thresholds ~k. Let R~k,t = p
~k,t
u /ptd. In the
limit as the number of rounds goes to infinity, the fraction of the agent’s requests that
have an agent willing and able to satisfy them that get satisfied is (R~k,t−Rkt+1~k,t )/(1−R
kt+1
~k,t
)
if R~k,t , 1 and kt/(kt + 1) if R~k,t = 1.
Proof. Consider the Markov chainM that results from fixing the agent’s policy
to skt in PG,~S (~k),t. M satisfies the requirements given in Theorem A.1.1 to have a
limit distribution. It can be easily verified that the distribution gives the agent
probability Ri(1−R)/(1−Rk+1) of having i dollars if R , 1 and probability 1/(k+1)
if R = 1 satisfies the detailed balance condition and thus is the limit distribution.
This gives the probabilities given in the theorem. 
THEOREM 3.2.4. Suppose that t and s are two types that agree except for the value
of χ, and that χt < χs. If ~k = (kt, ks) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for G = ({t, s}, ~f , h,m, n)
with social welfare w, then there exist m′, and n′ such that ~k′ = (ks) is an ε-Nash
equilibrium for G′m′,n′ = ({t}, {1}, h,m′, n′) with social welfare greater than w.
Proof. We prove the theorem by finding m′, and n′ such that agents in G′m′ that
play some strategy k get essentially the same utility that an agent with sybils
would by playing that strategy inG. Since ks was the optimal strategy for agents
with sybils inG, it must be optimal inGm′,n′ as well. Since agentswith sybils have
utility at least as great as those without, social welfare will be at least as large in
G′m′,n′ as in G.
Since an agent can earn a dollar only if he is able to satisfy the current re-
quest, 0 < pm,~k,su < βs. The constraint that hm′n′, the total amount of money, is a
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natural number means that m′ must be a rational number. For the moment, we
ignore that constraint and allow m′ to take on any value in [0, k′t ]. From Equa-
tion (A.2), pm
′,~k′,t
u is continuous in d∗q~k′ , which, by Lemma 2.2.1, is continuous in
λ
m′,~k′ and thus m
′. We use this continuity to show that we can find a value of m′
such that pm,~k,su = pm
′,~k′,t
u . By Equation (2.3), if m
′
= 0 then d∗q~k′ ,m(t, 0) = 1, and if
m′ = k′t then d∗q~k′ ,m(t, k
′
t) = 1. Combining these with Equation (A.2) gives p0,
~k′,t
u = 0
and pm
′,~k′,t
u = βt. Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists an m
′ such
that pm,~k,su = pm
′,~k′,t
u . For this choice of m
′, observe that by Lemma 2.3.1, PG,~S (~k),s
and PGm′ ,~S (~κ′),t have the same optimal threshold policy.
If m′ is rational, say m′ = a/b, take n′ = bn; then hm′n′ is an integer and, by the
argument above, ~k′ is an equilibrium for Gm′,n′ . Since pm
′,~k′
u = p
~k,s
u > p
~k,t
u , we must
have ζGm′,n′ < ζG. Thus, social welfare has increased. If m
′ is not rational, we in-
stead use a rational value m′′ sufficiently close to m′ that ~k′ is still an equilibrium
for Gm′,n′ and ζGm′′ ,n′′ < ζG. 
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.3.2
LEMMA 3.3.2. If d is a fully-supported distribution of money with finite support,
there exist an infinite number of explanations of d.
Proof. Fix λ. The distribution d and λ determine an explanation ~f as follows. By
Equation (3.3), we need ~f to satisfy d( j)∑Kdi=0 dλ(i, j).
Recall that Kd is the maximum value for which d(Kd) > 0. Start by consider-
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ing fKd . By the definition of dλ, dλ(i, j) = 0 if j > i. Thus, the constraint becomes
d(Kd) = dλ(Kd , Kd) = fKdλKd/(
Kd∑
l=0
λl).
Take fKd to be the unique value that satisfies this equation. Once we have de-
fined fKd , again apply the constraint and take fKd−1 to be the unique value that
satisfies
d(Kd−1) = dλ(Kd, Kd−1)+dλ(Kd − 1, Kd−1) = fKdλKd−1/(
Kd∑
l=0
λl)+ fKd−1λKd−1/(
Kd−1∑
l=0
λl).
Iterating this process uniquely defines ~f as the unique value that satisfies
d( j) =
Kd∑
i= j
dλ(i, j) =
Kd∑
i= j
fiλ j/(
i∑
l=0
λl),
or
fi = (
i∑
l=0
λl)/λi
d(i) −
Kd∑
j=i+1
f jλi/(
j∑
l=0
λl)
 .
However, ~f may not be an explanation, since some f j may be negative. This
happens exactly when
d(i) <
Kd∑
j=i+1
f jλi/(
j∑
l=0
λl). (A.14)
As λ grows large, the right-hand side of (A.14) tends to 0. Since d is fully-
supported, we must have d(i) > 0. Thus, we can ensure that (A.14) does not
hold for any i by taking λ sufficiently large. Thus, for sufficiently large λ, ~f pro-
vides an explanation for d. Continuing to increase λwill give an infinite number
of different explanations. 
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